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ABSTRACT
A Study of Pre and Post Cold War 
Presidential International 
Crisis Rhetoric
by
Flora A .Jackson
Dr. Thomas Burkholder, Thesis Committee Chair 
Professor of Communication 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
This study examines three speeches delivered by U.S. presidents during times of 
international crises, Woodrow W ilson’s speech on April 2, 1917, George H. W. Bush’s 
speech delivered on January 16, 1991, and the speech by George W. Bush delivered on 
September 20, 2001. Elements of epideictic, deliberative and forensic strategies were 
applied to the discourse to determine whether the speeches conformed to expectations for 
presidential international crisis rhetoric. This thesis extends a study completed in 1989 in 
which Bonnie J. Dow argued that only epideictic and deliberative strategies appear in 
international crisis rhetoric. In contrast, this study found that, in order for the discourse 
to be effective, a combination of epideictic, deliberative and forensic strategies must be 
present in international crisis rhetoric.
Il l
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CHAPTER 1
m TRODU CTION
To establish crisis rhetoric as a genre, critics need to examine the fu ll 
range o f  such discourse, determine the role o f  substantive, stylistic, and 
situational elements, and give attention to the functions o f  the discourse. 
With such analysis, generic treatment o f  crisis rhetoric could be more 
useful and illuminating. (Bonnie J. Dow, 1989)
In a study published in 1989, Bonnie J. Dow examines speeches delivered by former 
president Ronald Reagan following the bombing of a U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut, 
Lebanon, the U.S. invasion of the Caribbean island nation of Grenada, and the Soviet 
attack on a Korean airliner (295). She concludes that these speeches share situational and 
strategic elements that she tentatively labels as characteristics of presidential “crisis 
rhetoric.” However, Dow recognizes that her study, like others that preceded it, is limited 
by the small number of texts examined and calls for subsequent research to test her 
conclusions (308). Dow says critics should examine a full range of discourse, including 
presidential speeches delivered prior to W orld W ar II.
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Based on the invitation from Dow to investigate other presidential discourse to 
determine whether this type of crisis rhetoric is a genre, this study examines speeches by 
three American Presidents given in a time of United States military action to determine 
whether they share situational and strategic elements that Dow labels as characteristics of 
presidential crisis rhetoric. The speeches include: President Woodrow W ilson’s April 2, 
1917, speech to Congress asking for a declaration of war on Germany; President George 
H. W. Bush’s January 16, 1991, address to the nation announcing allied military action in 
the Persian Gulf; and President George W. Bush’s September 20, 2001, address before a 
joint session of Congress on the United States Response to the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001.
While there are a good number of speeches from which to choose, the scope of this 
study limits the number that can successfully be analyzed. Therefore, by completing a 
thorough comparison of W ilson’s speech and both of the Bushes’ speeches to determine 
whether there are significant differences and/or similarities in the rhetoric, evidence of 
the shared situational and strategic elements should support the claim that this type of 
presidential crisis rhetoric is a genre.
This chapter provides a brief overview of the rhetorical presidency and the value of a 
generic classification of presidential international crisis rhetoric. Then, a justification for 
the three speeches selected for this study is offered. This chapter concludes with a 
preview of the following chapters of this study.
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The Rhetorical Presidency 
Amos Kiewe explains that the rhetorical presidency began with Theodore Roosevelt 
and Woodrow Wilson and is based on the popular appeal of the president (xvi). Modem 
presidents use symbols and images in defining and constructing the reality of situations 
they want their audiences to accept, and, according to Karlyn Kohrs Campbell and 
Kathleen Hall Jamieson, “Skillful presidents [ . . . ]  engage in a process of transforming 
those who hear them into the audiences they desire” (5).
Campbell and Jamieson’s book. Deeds Done in W ords, addresses presidential rhetoric 
that has developed over time. They say that, “Presidential rhetoric is one source of 
institutional power, enhanced in the modem presidency by the ability of presidents to 
speak when, where, and on whatever topic they choose, and to a national audience 
through coverage by the electronic media” (3). They explain that the identity of the 
institution of the presidency arises out of the discourse (4). In addition, they state that 
modem presidents have created forms of discourse, or genres, that carry forward policy, 
mark beginnings and endings of situations, preserve the institution of the presidency, 
adapting it to changing times and conditions (4).
The Value of a Generic Classification of Rhetoric 
A study of genre, according to Campbell and Jamieson, “would produce a 
critical history exploring the ways in which rhetorical acts influence each other”
(1978 26). They say that:
Because rhetoric is of the public life, because rhetorical acts are 
concemed with ideas and processes rooted in the here and now of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
social and political life, rhetoric develops in time and through time. 
Ironically, the traditional emphasis on individual speeches and 
speakers as rooted historically in a particular time and place is, in 
an important sense, anti-historical, because it fails to recognize the 
impact of rhetorical acts on other rhetorical acts, and it fails to 
recognize the powerful human forces which fuse recurrent forms 
into genres which, in an important sense, transcend specific time 
and place. (1978 26)
According to Campbell and Jamieson (1990), rhetorical genres perform specific 
functions in specific situations. They say that a genre “persists only as long as it remains 
a functional response to exigencies” (104). They also say that genres emphasize social 
and historical areas of rhetoric. Edwin Black (1978) suggests that there are limited 
situations in which rhetors can find themselves, as well as limitations in how they 
respond (133). He also says that critics can draw upon historical responses to construct a 
generic approach to other similar situations (133). It appears from these observations by 
Campbell, Jamieson, and Black that, by using a generic approach to analyze a particular 
piece of discourse, critics will be able to understand more fully how a genre has 
developed over time.
It is also important to consider that when a rhetorical act is identified as a part of a 
genre, it should, according to Kathryn M. Olson (1993) be “rehistorized” (sic) (299). 
Olson says that by “rehistorizing (sic) a generic perspective can make a further 
contribution to the understanding of how the rhetoric of public and social life develops 
‘in time and over tim e’” (300). In other words, rehistorizing can offer insight to the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
impact of rhetorical discourse on another rhetorical act, such as what this proposed study 
hopes to find in the presidential crisis rhetoric of Wilson, George H. W. Bush and George 
W. Bush.
Also important to the study of rhetorical genre is that genres are subjected to the 
pressures of changes in expectations of purpose, “and as rhetorical action establishes new 
precedents, advocates alter and expand existing genres or develop substitute forms better 
suited to achieve their ends” (Campbell and Jamieson 1990 104). Their example of this 
type of metamorphosis is found in the chapter on presidential war rhetoric.
Campbell and Jamieson (1978) state that “presidential war rhetoric illustrates both 
rhetorical continuity and adaptation to altered circumstances” (104). They continue by 
arguing that throughout the history of the United States, presidential war rhetoric exhibits 
five fundamental characteristics. These characteristics, according to Campbell and 
Jamieson are:
(1) every element in it proclaims that the momentous decision to resort to 
force is deliberate, the product of thoughtful consideration; (2) forceful 
intervention is justified through a chronicle or narrative from which 
argumentative claims are drawn; (3) the audience is exhorted to unanimity 
of purpose and total commitment; (4) the rhetoric not only justifies the use 
of force but also seeks to legitimize presidential assumption of the 
extraordinary powers of the commander in chief; and as a function of 
these other characteristics, (5) strategic misrepresentations play an 
unusually significant role in its appeals. (105)
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A Definition of Crisis Rhetoric and Justification 
for the Speeches Selected 
The three speeches to be analyzed for this study were chosen because, like those used 
by earlier critics, they fit into the generally accepted definition of international crisis. 
Murray Edelman (1977) says that, “the word ‘crisis’ connotes a threat or emergency 
people must face together” and that it “suggests a need for unity and for common 
sacrifice” (45).
Michael Brecher and Jonathan Wilkenfeld (1997) also offer a definition of 
international crisis. They say that,
“There are two defining conditions of an international crisis: (1) a change 
in type and/or an increase in intensity of disruptive, that is hostile verbal or 
physical, interactions between two or more states, with a heightened 
probability of military hostilities; that, in turn, (2) destabilizes their 
relationship and challenges the structure of an international system —  
global, dominant, or subsystem.” (5)
Brecher and W ilkenfeld also say that, “crisis is also closely linked to war" (6) and that 
the “occurrence of war at any point in the evolution of a crisis intensifies disruptive 
interaction, along with perceived harm and stress” (6). They conclude by saying that, “In 
fact, war is a subset of crises; that is, all wars result from crises, but not all crises lead to 
war” (7). Edelman says that war is a response to a foreign threat and that sacrifices are 
made disproportionately. For example, the groups of people making the majority of 
sacrifices during war are military personnel and poor people (45).
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President W ilson’s speech asking congress to declare war on Germany is one 
example of how a crisis can lead to war. The events leading up to United States 
involvement in World W ar I fit into Brecher and W ilkenfeld’s definition of crisis. 
American ships were sunk and American lives were lost because of German submarine 
warfare. Wilson believed it was necessary for the United States, as a newly formed 
world power, to show its strength and power against a country that he believed did not 
value human lives and independence. W ilson’s April 2, 1917, speech has not yet been 
analyzed as a form of presidential international crisis rhetoric and would satisfy D ow’s 
invitation to study a speech presented prior to World War 11. W ilson’s speech will also 
provide a sample of pre-Cold W ar rhetoric. Jim A. Kuypers (1997) considers that the 
Cold W ar period from 1947 and 1991 is the framing device for presidential crisis rhetoric 
(15). 1 argue that W ilson’s speech is a part of the genre of presidential crisis rhetoric and 
believe my study will prove my argument to be valid.
After the end of the Cold War period, America was faced with “the new post Cold 
W ar era” (Foreign Affairs 1990/1991) of peace and negotiation. However, the President 
was faced with the responsibility to protect America and the world from a dictator with 
few scruples. President George H. W. Bush was faced with a crisis in the Persian Gulf. 
For six months prior to the United States’ military action following Saddam Hussein’s 
attacks on Kuwait, the President worked with other world leaders in the United Nations 
Security Council to force Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait. This was a time during the 
“embryonic post-Cold W ar world order” (Foreign Affairs 1990 -  1991 1), and that 
domination by a power of an area of the world that held resources “vital to the well-being 
of the international” (Foreign Affairs 1990 -  1991 1) could not be permitted. President
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Bush had begun a secretly approved military operation to bomb Iraq from the air and on 
the sea that was set to occur in mid-January 1991 (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 1997 317). 
Brecher and Wilkenfeld state that, “this decision triggered a full-scale crisis for the U.S. 
because it generated three defining conditions of a crisis — basic value threat, namely the 
human and material costs of war, finite time, and the higher likelihood of military 
hostilities” (317). After further attempts to force Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait failed, 
on January 16, 1991, President Bush announced that military action against Iraq would 
occur in just a matter of hours. While a number of scholars have analyzed this speech, 1 
will apply D ow ’s approach to a generic classification to the text.
Finally, 1 believe it is important to include an analysis of the speech given by 
President George W. Bush on September 20, 2001, after the terrorists attacked America. 
Terrorists had infiltrated the country and attacked the innocent people of the United 
States on their own soil. On September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the W orld Trade 
Center, the Pentagon, and two passenger airlines proved that the United States is not 
impervious to invasion by people who seek to destroy our country’s quest for peace and 
power. President George W. Bush was suddenly confronted with encouraging strength in 
American citizens while dealing with the devastation of lives and collateral damage and 
making the decision to seek and destroy those responsible for the attacks. On September 
20, 2001, Bush addressed the United States Congress and the people of America and the 
world, announcing America’s intent to destroy any person or country that had any 
involvement in the events of September 11'*’. The American people responded as they 
did in both W orld W ar 1 and W orld W ar 11; patriotism soared. According to R. Kenton 
Bird and Elizabeth Barker Brandt, the shock of the attacks on the W orld Trade Center,
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the Pentagon, and two American passenger airlines was even greater than the attacks on 
Pearl Harbor in 1941. This was a time when United States citizens were confused about 
what caused the events and wondered about the security of our country.
The selected speeches by Presidents Wilson, George H. W. Bush, and George W. 
Bush will be analyzed by applying the three factors that Dow calls situational and 
strategic elements in presidential crisis rhetoric. Again, these factors are (1) response to 
the situation; (2) the audience’s needs; and (3) the speaker’s purpose (296). Olson says 
that it is incumbent on the critic to provide evidence of the situation as perceived by the 
rhetor. This evidence can be drawn from the texts of the discourse and other information 
concerning the situation examined by the critic.
W hether one is identifying a ‘new ’ genre or classifying a rhetorical act as 
a member of a recognized genre, then, a convincing case that a particular 
rhetoric (sic) act is an embodiment of a specific genre depends 
significantly on the critic’s evidence that the rhetor perceived his or her 
situation in a particular way. The critic’s perception alone that the two 
situations are similar is insufficient grounds to support the claim that a 
genre is present. (304)
She continues to caution critics by stating that, “Because different participants (e.g., 
the rhetor, the immediate audience, later audiences, a critic) may have different, even 
conflicting perceptions of the rhetor’s situation, it is imperative to elevate one situational 
perception as authoritative for the purpose of detecting the presence of a genre” (303). 
Olson also cautions that, “the success of a generic embodiment must be evaluated by 
examining an intended audience’s response to the rhetor’s choices” (304). In addition.
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she says that it is also important to examine how rhetors use historical discourse to 
benefit their current situation.
Carolyn M iller (1984) offers that for the term “genre” to be useful as a theory or 
critical approach, it must not simply refer to just any type of discourse. A particular 
rhetorical genre must be a sound and stable method of classification (151). She continues 
by stating that genres are “typified rhetorical actions based on recurrent situations” (159).
Miller says that there are specific problems that have not been considered in previous 
attempts to define a rhetorical genre. One problem, she says, is that the relationship 
between the rhetor and his/her perception of the situation needs to be understood.
Another problem M iller points out is in understanding how (the rhetor’s use of 
symbolism) and substance (the use of semantics) fuse a generic form together in the 
situation. A third problem she sees is placing a type of generic discourse on what she 
calls “a hierarchal scale of generalizations about language use” (155).
Miller provides a rationale for the study of a rhetorical genre. She says:
To base a classification of discourse upon recurrent situation or, more 
specifically, upon exigence understood as social motive, is to base it upon 
the typical joint rhetorical actions available at a given point in history and 
culture. Studying the typical uses of rhetoric, and the forms that it takes in 
those uses, tells us less about the art of the individual rhetors or the 
excellence of particular texts than it does about the character of a culture 
or an historical period. (158)
Examination of the texts for this study should reveal similarities in situation and 
purpose based on the definition of an international crisis. What the analysis should show
10
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is a difference in response by the audience, both implicitly and explicitly, for each act. In 
addition, this study should reveal how each of the United States Presidents uses the 
tradition of the role of the President to rhetorically respond to crisis situations.
With Dow’s invitation to continue the study of presidential crisis rhetoric and the 
advice of other scholars, such as Olson and Miller, I will examine other works of scholars 
concerning presidential crisis rhetorical situations, the rhetor’s motives, as well as what 
scholars say about generic criticism and the function of epideictic, deliberative, and 
forensic strategies used in presidential crisis rhetoric.
Preview of Following Chapters
Chapter 2, The Literature Review, will include a review and discussion of prior 
studies concerning presidential crisis rhetoric as a genre, including any current studies of 
the texts. Since there appear to be very few studies completed by others than Windt, 
Cherwitz, Zagacki, and Dow, this section may be limited.
Chapter 3 discusses the historical background and rhetorical problems faced by each 
rhetor during the time leading up to the crisis discourse.
Chapter 4 provides a textual analysis of the discourse by applying the characteristics 
of crisis rhetoric.
Chapter 5 concludes this study and provides a discussion based on the results of the 
critical analysis of each of the documents used in this study as they apply to the genre of 
presidential crisis rhetoric. Questions that will be addressed will include: (1) is rhetorical 
history being repeated each time a situation occurs where the United States is faced with 
a threat to its position as the world’s most powerful nation? A number of scholars agree
11
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that a generic study of discourse is important to discover how rhetorical acts influence 
one another. If critics observe historical issues concerning crisis rhetoric, situational 
components will help the critic understand the impact of a rhetorical genre over time; (2) 
Does the American’s public opinion of the situation and the rhetor affect the intended 
result of the act?; And finally, (3) are the claims by Dow, Campbell, Jamieson, and others 
concerning similarities in situation, strategic response and needs of the audience in 
presidential crisis rhetoric evident in the documents?
12
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter will examine the definition of an international crisis on which critics 
have based their studies and how critics explain presidential crisis rhetoric by a review 
existing literature. A definition of international crisis is important because this type of 
crisis usually results in military actions or war. The literature that is reviewed in this 
chapter has been selected because it provides a number of frameworks that can be 
considered when analyzing presidential crisis rhetoric for a generic classification.
A Definition of International Crisis 
Murray Edelman (1977) says that, “the word ‘crisis’ connotes a threat or emergency 
people must face together” and that it “suggests a need for unity and for common 
sacrifice” (45).
Michael Brecher and Jonathan W ilkenfeld (1997) also offer a definition of 
international crisis. They say that.
There are two defining conditions of an international crisis: (I)  a change 
in type and/or an increase in intensity of disruptive, that is hostile verbal or 
physical, interactions between two or more states, with a heightened 
probability of military hostilities; that, in turn, (2) destabilizes their
13
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relationship and challenges the structure of an international system —  
global, dominant, or subsystem. (5)
Brecher and Wilkenfeld also say that, “crisis is also closely linked to war" (6) and that 
the “occurrence of war at any point in the evolution of a crisis intensifies disruptive 
interaction, along with perceived harm and stress” (6). They conclude by saying that, “In 
fact, war is a subset of crises; that is, all wars result from crises, but not all crises lead to 
war” (7). Edelman says that war is a response to a foreign threat and that sacrifices are 
made disproportionately. For example, the groups of people making the majority of 
sacrifices during war are military personnel, and the poor people (45).
The Definition of International Crisis and Its 
Application to Crisis Rhetoric 
Prior studies by Theodore Windt, and Richard Cherwitz and Richard Zagacki that 
Bonnie J. Dow refers to in her study concern a type of presidential crisis rhetoric that 
Windt labels “international crisis rhetoric.” Specificity of this type of rhetoric is 
important because crises can take on a broad range of definitions. W indt says that the 
term “crisis” became popular during John F. Kennedy’s presidency to describe difficult 
decisions Kennedy had to make. Richard Nixon continued to use the term crisis in the 
same context during his administration (92) and we hear Presidents using the same term 
today.
Windt argues that, “a crisis that does not involve an external military attack on the 
United States is a political event rhetorically created by the President in which the public 
predictably rallies to his defense” (92). He also argues that tradition and precedents play
14
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a part in the rhetorical act. Windt says that when Presidents declare a situation as a crisis, 
they first tell the people that a dangerous situation exists and that they, the Presidents, 
must decide how to address the situation. Secondly, Presidents state that this new 
situation is a continuation of ongoing serious differences between beliefs and principals. 
Lastly, Presidents ask the people to take the “moral high ground,” and accept and support 
the actions they have taken. Windt says that the rhetoric in these types of situations is 
declaratory (98).
Cherwitz and Zagacki (1986) suggest that the techniques and strategies in presidential 
crisis rhetoric are of two varieties, justificatory and consummatory. They describe 
justificatory rhetoric as when the President focuses his remarks on the explanation and 
rationalization for military retaliation. Consummatory rhetoric, on the other hand, 
provides a warning or a threat that any future violent acts will be answered. When 
looking at the language used in both justificatory and consummatory discourse they state 
that,
both employ deliberate, hard-hitting, offensive language to dramatize 
perpetration of crises; while attempting to create crisis atmospheres, both 
seek resolution, eliminating the need for further moves and countermoves 
which could escalate emergencies to dangerous if not catastrophic levels; 
and both underscore the importance of American ideals and values, using 
crises to reinforce and reaffirm the superiority of American democratic 
principles to aggressive, terroristic and uncivilized attributes exemplified 
by perpetrators. (309-310)
15
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Cherwitz and Zagacki claim that other differences in the varieties of discourse are 
found in the tone of the rhetoric. Justificatory rhetoric is “irrevocable, direct and 
decisive, announcing concrete, definitive” (310) military response to violent actions by a 
foreign nation. They also say that consummatory discourse is circumspect and 
“emphasizes the importance of caution, patience, resolve and inner strength in reacting to 
wrongful deeds” (310) committed by aggressors and the act of patience is depicted as a 
virtue and not a sign of weakness or indecisiveness.
In a critical analysis of the rhetoric of President Lyndon B. Johnson’s speeches 
concerning the Tonkin Gulf crisis, Cherwitz (1998) states that, “Although physical moves 
are usually associated with crisis during conflicts between two nations, it is often the 
president’s rhetoric that draws attention to the situation, and defines it in such a way that 
the nation’s response is clearly implied” (100). In his analysis of the speeches presented 
by President Johnson on August 4 and 5, 1964, Cherwitz says that, “Johnson’s rhetoric 
created an international crisis” (94). Cherwitz says that in each of his speeches,
Johnson’s message revealed a justificatory variety of rhetoric. He also describes the 
language used in the speech as contributing to the impression of a crisis.
Dow’s study claims that the studies of presidential crisis rhetoric conducted by Windt 
in 1973, and Cherwitz and Zagacki in 1986, overlook the elements of how different 
situations that give rise to crisis rhetoric call for different responses. Dow looks at three 
speeches by President Ronald Reagan: the address in September, 1983 following an 
attack on a Korean airliner by the Soviet Union; the address on the events in Lebanon and 
Grenada in October of 1983; and the April 1986 speech following the United States air 
strikes on Libya (295).
16
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Dow describes these speeches as having occurred because of two different situations. 
She says that, in the case of the speeches concerning the Korean airliner and the events in 
Lebanon when United States Marines were attacked and killed by hostile forces, the 
American public had already perceived that events were a significant crisis before the 
President gave his address (295). Then, in the case of Grenada and Libya, it was the 
President’s address stating the action taken by America against the terrorist attacks that 
resulted in the public’s perception of the situations as crises (295). She goes on to argue 
that there is an important difference in these two types of crisis rhetoric. In the instance 
of Reagan’s speech concerning Lebanon, current public opinion was that a crisis existed, 
yet in the instance of the other two speeches, Reagan’s rhetoric created the crises in order 
to gain public support for the action taken. Dow then states that there are three factors 
that vary significantly in different types of crisis situations. These factors are response to 
the situation, the audience’s needs; and the speaker’s purpose (296).
Dow contends that the study of presidential crisis rhetoric should take into 
consideration the exigencies giving rise to the discourse, that different situations require 
different responses, and that crisis rhetoric should be analyzed based on an understanding 
of how the rhetorical discourse responds to the exigencies created by the situation (295). 
An earlier article by Lloyd F. Bitzer (1968) supports D ow ’s contention.
Bitzer states that the “situation is the source and ground of rhetorical activity and 
[ .. .] of rhetorical criticism” (6). He claims that there are three components of any 
rhetorical situation: exigence, the audience, and constraints (6). According to Bitzer, a 
controlling exigence will serve as the organizing factor in the rhetorical situation. This 
controlling exigence will specify “the audience to be addressed and the change to be
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effected” (7). The audience will consist of those people who can be influenced by the 
rhetoric and can serve as “mediators of change” (8). The limitations, or constraints as 
stated by Bitzer, which are a part of the rhetorical situation are made up of “people, 
events, objects and relations which are parts of the situation because they have the power 
to constrain decision and action needed to modify the exigence” (8). Bitzer continues by 
stating, “There are two main classes of constraints. The first is those originated or 
managed by the rhetor and his method, and the second, those other constraints, in the 
situation, which may be operative” (8). He also says that the rhetor must know which 
constraints must be determined as either proper or improper for the situation.
Bitzer’s analysis can be compared to a study conducted by James W. Pratt (1970). 
Pratt claims that, “Events of crisis should produce rhetorical acts which are related to the 
situation of crisis” (194), and that the speeches presented during crisis situations should 
have “distinctive identifiable characteristics” (194). He examines three speeches 
delivered at different times of “generally recognized international crisis” (195). The 
speeches were delivered by President Dwight Eisenhower on October 31, 1956, 
concerning the Suez crisis. President John Kennedy on October 22, 1962, about the 
Cuban missile crisis, and by President Lyndon Johnson on August 4, 1964, during the 
Gulf of Tonkin crisis.
Pratt’s analyses of the speeches revealed that Eisenhower and Johnson’s situations 
shared the same characteristics in that the American audience already knew about the 
events. Kennedy’s speech, however, did not share the same characteristics because most 
of the American public probably did not know about the crisis situation, and Americans 
were hearing about it for the first time. Pratt says that each of the presidents assumed
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different roles that affected the type of speeches that were delivered. He claims that both 
Eisenhower and Johnson assumed the role of “reporter,” while Kennedy spoke in the first 
person and as the President. He continues by saying that,
An examination of the public responses to these speeches -  or the critical 
reactions to them -  might also suggest which of these strategies is most 
effective or appropriate in crisis settings. On the basis of these three 
speeches, it appears that the speaking characteristics of the president 
involved and the specific nature of the crisis setting combine to determine 
the type of speech which will result [ . . . ] .  (202)
Pratt concludes by stating that examining the speeches as a rhetorical genre should add to 
the process of our understanding of communication during crisis situations (203).
The Argument Against Generic Classification 
of International Crisis Rhetoric 
There are some scholars who believe that classification of presidential international 
crisis rhetoric as a genre results in ambivalence. Blair and Houck argue that the studies 
of presidential crisis rhetoric as a genre pose two ambivalences -  one concerning the 
status of the genre and the other concerning the relationship of the situation to the crisis 
rhetoric (92). They refer to Pratt’s study as evading the issue of what constitutes a genre 
of presidential crisis rhetoric by merely assuming there are clear cases of crisis rhetoric, 
and proceed to criticize Windt for assuming the particular genre and simply using his 
analysis of Kennedy’s Cuban Missile crisis speech and Nixon’s Cambodia speech to 
support the genre’s characteristics (Blair and Houck 93). They also criticize Cherwitz
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and Zagacki for agreeing with other scholars that the genre exists; yet they deny that their 
study defines a generic classification. Blair and Houck also argue that Dow is ambivalent 
concerning the generic classification of presidential crisis rhetoric because, Dow argues, 
not all of the presidential rhetoric relating to crises has been examined (Blair and Houck 
94). Turning from the ambivalence in the status of the genre, Blair and Houck discuss 
the ambivalence in the relationship of the situation to the rhetoric.
Arguing that critics have either considered or assumed that there is a relationship 
between situation and crisis rhetoric, Blair and Houck offer examples of what critics say 
about situation. They state that both Pratt and Windt stipulate a limitation of the situation 
by examining speeches involving international circumstances; Cherwitz and Zagacki 
studied speeches concerning attacks on American property or people by foreign powers; 
and Dow examined speeches concerning military attacks on American non-combatants 
outside of wartime (Blair and Houck 95). Blair and Houck argue that a generic claim of 
crisis rhetoric cannot be limited to international crises and offer W indt’s characterization 
of the stages of crisis rhetoric to support their claim. They go on to say that 
“philosophical arguments over rhetoric’s general situated or situation-generating 
character at large” (97) cannot support Dow’s claim of two types of crisis rhetoric - 
rhetorical responses to “real” crises, and rhetorical responses that create crises (Blair and 
Houck 97). Blair and Houck then offer a solution to what they believe to be difficulties 
experienced by Windt, Cherwitz, Zagacki, and Dow to generically categorize crisis 
rhetoric. They say that critics should consider “rethinking rhetorical genre as a critical 
heuristic” (98) therefore making the generic category a hypothetical premise. In essence, 
Blair and Houck believe that a generic classification limits how speeches are analyzed.
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They state that critics are not “confined to the question; What speeches are contained 
within this genre? She or he may ask instead: W hat is this speech like if it is read as a 
crisis speech?” (99).
Blair and Houck use this premise to analyze N ixon’s speeches on his Vietnamization 
policy on November 13, 1969, the Cambodian incursion speech of April 30, 1970, his 
speech regarding mining Haiphong Harbor delivered on May 8, 1972, and three other 
speeches not related to international events. They treat these examples of “presidential 
crisis rhetoric as an entreaty by a president to the nation to see itself seriously and 
immediately threatened and to conduct itself as such” (99), and addressed the issues of 
situation, perception, and honesty. Blair and Houck found that there were “striking 
similarities’ (107) in all of the speeches, which seemed to them remarkable because the 
situations in which they were delivered were not the same.
Three of Nixon’s speeches concerned circumstances in the Vietnam conflict, a fourth 
speech concerned issues of economic policy, and the last two concerned the Watergate 
investigation (107). Blair and Houck were able to find one common element in all of the 
speeches -  “either a potential threat to N ixon’s political status or the complete absence of 
threat to him or the nation. In fact, threats to N ixon’s popularity, ideology, or status in 
office appear to have been the only ‘crisis’ addressed by these speeches, even though 
each crisis was couched as a threat to a larger group or principal” (108).
The heuristic approach of simply analyzing speeches as crisis rhetoric has been taken 
by a number of other critics. Amos Kiewe (1994) compiled a collection of essays that 
studied presidential crisis rhetoric from Truman through George H. W. Bush that include 
Blair and Houck’s study. Kiewe supports the notion that critics who have argued for a
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generic classification have been challenged. He notes that the purpose of his compilation 
is to enlighten the student of presidential crisis rhetoric of the role of the president during 
a crisis situation and to illuminate certain features and patterns of presidential behaviors 
as the behaviors relate to the speeches. The essays included are representative of a 
longitudinal study of various discourses of a crisis’s life cycle, or of several crises in one 
presidency (xv) and depict how presidents construct their responses during crisis 
situations. Examples of the studies included are: Robert L. Ivie’s “Declaring a National 
Emergency: Trum an’s Rhetorical Crisis and the Great Debate of 1951;” “Eisenhower, 
Little Rock, and the Rhetoric of Crisis” by Martin J. Medhurst; Enrico Pucci, Jr.’s “Crisis 
as Pretext: John P. Kennedy and the Rhetorical Construction of the Berlin Crisis;” and 
Kurt Ritter’s “Lyndon B. Johnson’s Crisis Rhetoric after the Assassination of John F. 
Kennedy: Securing Legitimacy and Leadership.” Crisis rhetoric of Presidents Gerald 
Ford, Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, and two studies concerning the rhetoric of George 
H. W. Bush are also part of Kiewe’s compilation. Kiewe advises critics to be “cautious 
not to be constrained by the generic approach and to consider crisis rhetoric as a premise 
to be used in reading a variety of speeches” (xxxiii).
While Kiewe examines crisis rhetoric during the Cold War Era, Jim A. Kuypers looks 
at the Post Cold W ar crisis rhetoric of President Bill Clinton. Kuypers’ study concerns 
how a president is able to construct a response to a crisis situation without being able to 
draw from the Cold W ar meta-narrative in order to frame the situation as an international 
crisis (3), and how the press can frame the situation so that the public will interpret it “in 
a specific manner” (10). By implementing W indt’s theory of crisis formation, Kuypers 
studies how a president uses resources to frame the situation as a crisis. He “takes the
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position that the study of presidential crisis rhetoric should not primarily approach an 
event as an example of crisis (Cherwitz and Zagacki) or examine a speech/text through a 
genre of crisis (Blair and Houck) or suggest a situation is already perceived as a crisis 
(Dow 28). Instead, Kuypers’ study suggests that researchers would learn more about the 
discourse if they examine “the interplay of various texts and contexts that act to alter the 
situation and public perception of the situation” (28). Therefore, he says that, “criticism 
of presidential crisis rhetoric should be a blend of discursive and material conditions” 
(28). Kuypers claims that his study contributes to the understanding of presidential crisis 
rhetoric by advancing the notion of the rhetoric “as an inter-animation of text and context 
within situational constraints,” (29) as it occurs after the Cold War. The study also 
contributes to the understanding of the role of the printed press as it relates to presidential 
crisis rhetoric.
A Summary of Framework 
Each of the scholars previously noted in this chapter have applied certain theories or 
frameworks by which they have attempted to classify the rhetoric. Windt says that 
historical precedents play a part in the rhetoric. Cherwitz and Zagacki state that the 
rhetoric takes on either a justificatory or consummatory tone. Dow argues that different 
situations call for different responses, and it appears that her theory is supported to some 
degree by both Bitzer and Pratt. While we have seen how Kuypers implements W indt’s 
theory in his compilation of studies, no other research was found that applied the other 
scholars’ theories.
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In keeping with the purpose of this study to further the research for a generic 
classification of presidential international crisis rhetoric, I intend to use a combination of 
W indt’s historical perspective of the rhetoric and D ow’s framework and apply them to 
the three selected speeches. This study will provide a comparison of situational 
constraints that may have required certain responses. One of the questions to be 
addressed is whether or not the situation was a political event rhetorically created by the 
President as Windt stated. Also, the language used by each of the rhetors will be 
compared in the attempt to classify the rhetoric in a generic sense. Audience’s responses 
will also be examined to contribute to the understanding of the effectiveness of the 
rhetorical response to the situation.
The next chapter of this thesis will be an historical account of each of the rhetorical 
problems faced by each of the presidents, and will reveal similarities in each president’s 
situation. Most of the studies concerning international crisis rhetoric have involved the 
Cold W ar era. The rhetoric examined in this study occurred prior to and after the Cold 
W ar era. This, I believe, will further support the framework of both Windt and Dow for 
the generic classification of presidential crisis rhetoric.
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CHAPTER 3
AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE AND 
THE RHETORICAL PROBLEM 
The previous chapter introduced a definition of international crisis rhetoric and 
provided a review of some of the studies offered by scholars to understand the 
characteristics of presidential international crisis rhetoric. This chapter will provide a 
brief background of Presidents Wilson, George H. W. Bush, and George W. Bush. Then, 
the crises and rhetorical problems faced by the presidents will be described to answer the 
question of how the crises are defined based on situations as stated in the presidential 
rhetoric.
A Brief Background of the Presidents 
Woodrow Wilson was elected to his first term as President of the United Sates in 
1912. With only two years of experience in politics as Governor of the State of New 
Jersey, Wilson was recognized during his time of being governor as a possible candidate 
for the presidency (U.S. Presidents xii). Prior to entering politics, Wilson was a scholar. 
He held a law degree from the University of Virginia, and received a Ph.D. from Johns 
Hopkins University. Wilson was also an accomplished student of government and wrote 
two books. Congressional Government and Constitutional Government, as well as a
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number of articles published in the “Overland Monthly” in 1904 (Lippman 13). Another 
notable fact about Wilson is that he studied rhetoric at Davidson College and Princeton 
University and he “prized rhetorical performance” (Buhite xvi).
While Wilson was adept at composing and delivering substantive discourse due to his 
schooling, America’s 41st President, George H. W. Bush’s formal educational 
background is very different. Unlike the scholarly education of Wilson, George H. W. 
Bush attended the prestigious, private, Phillips Academy in Andover, Massachusetts, and 
excelled in sports. He enlisted in the United State’s Navy after graduation and served as 
a distinguished Navy pilot. After his military service, George H. W. Bush enrolled in 
Yale University as a student of economics, and graduated in 1948. He then became very 
successful in the oil business in Texas prior to beginning his political career. Bush was 
elected United States President in 1988 and served one term. As noted on the 
W hitehouse’s official Web site, his political experience includes serving two terms as the 
Congressional representative from Texas, Ambassador to the United Nations, Chairman 
of the Republican National Committee, Chief of the United States Liaison Office in the 
People’s Republic of China, and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. He 
served as Vice President of the United States for President Ronald Reagan from 1981 
through 1988. His first bom son, George W., followed some of the same paths in the 
areas of education and in politics.
According to his biographical information available on the Whitehouse official Web 
site, Whitehouse.gov, George W. Bush, like his father, received his formal education at 
Yale University. He served as an F-102 fighter pilot in the Texas Air National Guard.
He then earned a M aster of Business Administration degree from Harvard Business
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School, followed by a career in the energy business. The younger Bush’s first entry into 
politics was working on his father’s presidential campaign. Before entering the political 
arena as Governor of Texas for two terms, he purchased a baseball franchise and served 
as the general manager of the Texas Rangers.
While President Wilson was certainly more adept at political discourse than either of 
the Bushes, the office of the presidency gave each of these men an opportunity to 
persuade their American publics and members of the federal government to accept their 
decisions regarding actions taken, or to be taken, in the events of international crises.
The Crises and Rhetorical Problems
W ilson’s Crisis
Theodore Windt says that, “ [t]he President’s perception of the situation and the 
rhetoric he uses to describe it mark an event as a crisis” (92). Upon a review of the 
situation leading up to America’s involvement in W orld War I, this concept is evident in 
Woodrow W ilson’s speech to Congress asking for a declaration of war on Germany.
Up until the attacks on the British Steamer, Falaba, on March 28, 1915, the American 
public believed that the Great W ar being fought in Europe would not interfere with 
American lives. They then found out that an American citizen, Leon C. Thrasher, 
drowned as a result of a German U-2 submarine torpedoing the Falaba (Tansill 252). On 
April 28, 1915, an American steamship, the Cushing, was attacked by a German 
seaplane, and on May 1, 1915, the Gulflight, an American tanker, was torpedoed (Tansill 
262). American lives were lost on the Cushing, two crewman of the Gulflight drowned, 
and the Gulflight’s captain was reported to have died of shock (Tansill 262). Then, two
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days after the attack on the Gulflight, a German submarine torpedoed the Lusitania in the 
waters near Ireland’s southern coast (Tansill 265). With the loss of more American lives, 
public opinion was mobilized against submarine warfare. Wilson, however, worked 
diligently to maintain neutrality. The main issue of 1916 was the war. The Democratic 
Party’s campaign slogan was, “He kept us out of war.” (Whitney & Whitney 235).
According to Francine Sanders Romero, while citizens generally supported W ilson’s 
position for the United States to remain neutral, “preparedness advocates argued that this 
stance should not be pursued at the expense of military readiness” (102). Those 
advocates were urging funding for the military and instituting a draft for personnel.
When Wilson ultimately conceded to demand funding for the military, he was criticized 
for moving the United States closer to entering the war (Romero 102). When Germany 
continued the attacks at sea without regard to the rights of humanity, Wilson addressed 
the Congress of the United States declaring Germany’s actions as a war against the 
United States and its citizens and that Congress must “take immediate steps not only to 
put the country in a more thorough state of defense but also to exert all its power and 
employ all its resources to bring the Government of the German Empire to terms and end 
the war” (W ilson’s 4/2/17 speech, par. 6).
W ilson’s Rhetorical Problem
W ilson’s rhetorical problem was to convince the Congress, and then the American 
public, that he had no choice but to ask for a declaration of war on Germany in order to 
protect freedom for all people in the world. A believer in the principal that only 
Congress had the right to declare war, Wilson began his speech with, “I have called the 
Congress into extraordinary session because there are serious, very serious, choices of
28
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
policy to be made, and made immediately, which it was neither right nor constitutionally 
permissible that I should assume the responsibility of making” (par. 1). His argument 
was simply stated:
There are, it may be, many months of fiery trial and sacrifice ahead of us. 
It is a fearful thing to lead this great peaceful people into war, into the 
most terrible and disastrous of all wars, civilization itself seems in the 
balance. But the right is more precious than peace, and we shall fight for 
the things which we have always carried nearest our hearts, - for 
democracy, for the right of those who submit to authority to have a voice 
in their own governments, for the rights and liberties of small nations, for 
a universal dominion of right by such a concert of free peoples as shall 
bring peace and safety to all nations and make the world itself at last free, 
(par. 19)
President Wilson described to Congress the events that he believed created the crisis. 
The fact that American lives were being affected by the actions of a foreign government, 
and that the motives of the German Government were against America’s values of 
freedom for all people in the world supported W indt’s conclusion that a crisis situation 
existed.
George H. W. Bush’s Crisis
Almost 74 years later, American’s were told that the United States would again enter 
a war on foreign soil. President George H. W. Bush appeared on national television to 
describe the military action by American forces against Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait. 
This situation also follows W indt’s characterization of a crisis.
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Just as Wilson watched the fighting in Europe escalate, Bush and the American public 
at large watched tensions build in the Persian Gulf. According to Lester H. Brune (1993), 
the last two years of the war between Iran and Iraq resulted in the formation of a multi­
national naval force to ensure that the G u lfs  oil shipping lanes remained open. Under 
the administration of President Ronald Reagan, the United States and other Western 
nations provided advanced weapons to Baghdad. Both Iran and Iraq complied with the 
demand for a cease fire, ending the war in August of 1988. Not all of the Washington 
leadership believed that Saddam Hussein had changed his radical views. Some believed 
that he would use military strength against Israel with the weapons America had 
provided. Brune states that the official policy of the Regan-Bush administration was to 
continue doing business with Iraq because it would benefit “the U.S. trade balance and 
strengthen W ashington’s pursuit of international restrictions on Iraq’s chemical, 
biological, and nuclear weapons” (47). This policy continued through the end of 
Reagan’s administration and in to Bush’s early term. There continued to be a division of 
hard and soft-line factions. Then, on March 22, 1990, the Senate approved the Jerusalem 
resolution that recognized Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. Congress approved the 
resolution on the following April 24" .̂ While Bush did not support the resolution, he 
failed to lobby strongly against it. The American public had no understanding of the 
issue because President Bush and the State Department continued to recognize Tel Aviv 
as the capital of Israel. When a delegation of Senators visited Saddam Hussein in Iraq 
within a month after passing the resolution, Hussein began his campaign to discredit the 
United States and convince the media that the United States and Israel were plotting 
against the Arabs (Brune 49).
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Hussein continued making fanatical statements against the United States such as the 
Arab people would suffer because the Soviets lost power to the United States. He 
stressed that the United States was now the dominant power in the Middle East and that 
America must withdraw their ships from the Persian Gulf. He also said he wanted the 
Arab states to pull their financial interests in American and Western European companies 
and invest in Eastern European companies and in the Soviet Union (Brune 50). The 
problem that faced the Bush administration was that they had perceived Hussein as a 
moderate, when in fact they had helped to create a monster that could destroy the Middle 
East (Brune 52). Saddam Hussein began his campaign of destruction with the attack on 
Kuwait.
According to an account of Desert Storm compiled by writers, editors, and 
correspondents of Time Warner Publishing, President George H. W. Bush first heard of 
the attacks on Kuwait on August 1, 1990 at 6:30 P.M. (Friedrick 11). Crown Prince 
Sheik Saad al-Abdullah al-Sabah called the American Embassy in Kuwait almost three 
hours later, asking for help and also asking that his request remain confidential. An hour 
later he called again to officially ask for help from the United States Government, no 
longer concerned about public knowledge (Freidrick 11). It was not possible for an 
immediate response of U.S. Troops because the closest military forces were some 3,000 
miles away in the Indian Ocean. While the United States could not immediately respond 
to the cry for help. President Bush was meeting with his advisors to consider options.
The very next day. President Bush met with reporters in the cabinet room at the White 
House. Bush delivered a brief statement at a press conference on August 2, 1990, 
condemning the Iraqi military invasion of Kuwait and stated, “We call for the immediate
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withdrawal of all Iraqi forces.” He also informed the press in his statement that he was 
exercising his authority under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act and 
had signed an Executive Order freezing Iraqi assets in the United States and prohibiting 
any transactions with Iraq. Bush stated that the State Department had been in contact 
with the governments of other countries urging their condemnation of Iraqi aggression, 
and that it was important for the international community to act together to remove the 
Iraqi forces from Kuwait immediately.
George H. W. Bush’s Rhetorical Problem
Gallup polls indicated that the American public was highly supportive of Bush’s 
actions. However, the closer it came to American troops being deployed to fight for the 
freedom of Kuwait, the polls revealed a decrease in public support. By January of 1991, 
polls indicated that public support for both continuing sanctions against Iraq and going to 
war with Hussein was waning. Bush’s approval rate decreased from 70% to 50% (Brune 
1993). The biggest problem Bush faced was the public’s fear that this war would be just 
like Vietnam (Rosenthal 1991, Brune 1993, and Pollock 1994).
In the June 15, 1991 edition of the New York Times, Andrew Rosenthal reported the 
results of a New York Times/CBS News poll. The poll showed that 58 per cent of the 
1512 people questioned approved of how the President was handling the crisis. This 
group also provided insight to the public’s expectations of the anticipated military action 
against Iraq. According to the article, most of the people questioned “said that they 
expected the war to last several months to more than a year, to require heavy combat on 
the ground, produce thousands of American deaths, and make a major attack by Iraqi
32
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
agents within the United States likely” (Rosenthal 1991). President Bush again tried to 
assure people when he said in his January 16, 1991 speech.
I ’ve told the American people before that this will not be another Viet 
Nam, and I repeat this here tonight. Our troops will have the best possible 
support in the entire world, and they will not be asked to fight with one 
hand tied behind their back. I ’m hopeful that this fighting will not go on 
for long and that casualties will be held to an absolute minimum, (par. 16) 
President Bush described to the people of America and the world the events that 
perpetuated the crisis. The actions of the enemy as described by the President in his 
speech and witnessed by people all over the world via the vast spectrum of available 
media supported W indt’s conclusion that a crisis situation existed.
George W. Bush’s Crisis
While Presidents Wilson and George H. W. Bush and the American public were able 
to prepare for the United States involvement in World War I and the Persian Gulf War, 
President George W. Bush and Americans faced a totally different situation that lead 
America in to yet another battle. This time it was not about U. S. citizens being attacked 
on foreign soil. This time it was about America under attack on its own soil without any 
warning.
On September 11, 2001, the American public watched as commercial airliners flew 
into the World Trade Center towers in New York City, and another commercial airliner 
flew in to the Pentagon in Washington, D C. Then, another commercial airliner went 
down in a field near Pittsburgh. While the buildings spewed fire and smoke and people 
ran away from the devastation, fellow Americans and people around the world watched
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and listened to the reports broadcast over television and radio. We were living a 
nightmare in broad daylight.
According to The 9/11 Commission Report (Report) four hijacked commercial planes 
began their assault on America. The first commercial airliner hit the World Trade 
Center’s North Tower at 8:46 AM. The South Tower was hit by a second airliner at 9:03 
AM. Thirty-four minutes later, a third airliner hit the western face of the Pentagon.
Then, at 10:03 AM a fourth airliner crashed in a field near Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. The 
total number if people killed by these four separate attacks totaled more than 2,981, 
surpassing the number of people killed by the attacks by the Japanese at Pearl Harbor in 
1941. The United States was under attack by terrorists.
According to the Report, America should not have been surprised, even though 
everyone in America was shocked at the attack on American soil. Terrorist attacks on 
Americans had been ensuing for a decade. First there was the attack on the World Trade 
Center with a truck bomb in February of 1993. Attacks on United States Citizens in 
Riyadh and Dhahran, Saudi Arabia killed 24 Americans and wounded hundreds of others 
in 1995.
It was 1997 before the United States intelligence community recognized Osama Bin 
Laden as a terrorist leader. Bin Laden publicly declared that “it was God’s decree that 
every Muslim should try his utmost to kill any American, military or civilian, anywhere 
in the world because of America’s ‘occupation’ of Islam’s holy places, and aggression 
against M uslims” (Report 2-3).
The Report states that Bin Laden’s group, al Qaeda, killed 224 people, which 
included 24 Americans, and wounded thousands more people by simultaneous truck
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bomb attacks on American embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, in 
August of 1998. A plot to bomb hotels frequented by American tourists was thwarted by 
Jordanian police in December of 1999. That same month, U.S. Customs agents arrested a 
member of al Qaeda at the Canadian border who was trying to smuggle in explosives to 
use to attack the Los Angeles International Airport. Then in October of 2000, an 
American destroyer, the USS Cole, was attacked with a motorboat filled with explosives. 
A hole blown in the side of the ship almost sank the vessel and the explosion killed 17 
American sailors. But nothing in the past compared to the “wake-up call” all Americans 
and the United States government got on the morning of September 11, 2001.
According to an article in the New York Times by David Sanger and Don Van Natta, 
when the news of the first airliner hitting a tower at Trade Center reached the President, 
he was about to enter a classroom full of children at an elementary school in Sarasota, 
Florida. Not knowing it to be other than an accident, he decided to stay at the event. Just 
minutes later, he was advised of the second airliner hitting the other tower. President 
Bush remained in his seat listening to the school children read as he received this news 
and lingered for a few minutes after the children had finished. Then minutes later, 
appearing before cameras in a classroom filled with teachers, staff and children, he 
announced to the world the apparent terrorist attack on the World Trade Center. He then 
said he would be returning to the White House immediately.
George W. Bush’s Rhetorical Problem
Bush had only been in office for just over seven months, and the way he got there was 
still questionable to many. Bush needed to convince the American public that he was up 
to the challenge of taking control of this situation and helping the country heal.
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R. W. Apple, Jr. provides an analysis of George W. Bush’s election to the presidency 
in an article in The New York Times. He states, “Mr. Bush became the first president 
since Harrison in 1888 to lose the popular vote but win the Electoral College. Only the 
intervention of the United States Supreme Court, itself as deeply divided as possible, 5 
votes to 4, tipped the Electoral College vote in Mr. Bush’s favor” (par. 3). Janet Elder 
reported in her article dated December 18, 2000 in The New York Times that, according to 
a CBS News poll. Bush would need to build public support.
Speaking to the American Public from the Texas House of Representatives after the 
Supreme Courts decision. The New York Times quoted Bush as stating, “I was not elected 
to serve one party, but to serve one nation. [...] Whether you voted for me or not, I will 
do my best to serve your interests [...] and I will work to earn your respect.” (Sanger). 
Coupling the resulting controversy of the election was Bush’s limited political 
experience. As Sanger also stated. Bush had only traveled abroad three times, not 
including his numerous trips to Mexico, and would be responsible for dealing with crises 
in the Middle East, and a division within his own political party concerning China, and 
Russia’s new assertiveness. So the question after the events of 9/11 was: Was this 
President capable of strong leadership?
In an October 7, 2001, article in the New York Times, D. T. Max says, “In a time of 
national crisis, words are key to the presidency. Too many and people tune out; too few 
and they think he is hiding.” This president was not the most eloquent speaker and what 
he had to say to the world would require careful construction.
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Conclusion
This historical review describes international situations that fit in with Michael 
Brecher and Jonathan W ilkenfeld’s (1997) definition of international crisis. Brecher and 
Wilkenfield say that the two defining conditions of an international crisis are a change in 
the type and/or an increase in intensity of disruptive (hostile verbal or physical) 
interactions between two or more states, with a increased probability of military 
hostilities, and a destabilization of their relationship that challenges the structure of a 
global, dominant international system or subsystem (5). In the case of W ilson’s situation, 
Germany had become a physical threat to the other neutral and friendly nations and 
United States, challenging “the principals of peace and justice in the life of the world” 
(Wilson par. 11). Saddam Hussein’s actions against the people of Kuwait are described 
by George H. W. Bush as “an affront to mankind and a challenge to the freedom of all” 
(par. 21). And, George W. Bush describes the attacks on the World Trade Towers and 
the Pentagon as an act of war against the country by “enemies of freedom” (par. 12).
The next chapter will compare their situations and apply D ow ’s theoretical 
perspective of crisis rhetoric to the texts to illustrate which strategies, either epideictic or 
deliberative, or a combination of both, are most appropriate based on each of the 
situations. In addition, I will examine how the rhetoric reflects the personality of the 
individual and how their audiences react to the discourse.
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CHAPTER 4
A TEXTUAL ANALYSIS 
The previous chapter presented historical details of the situations and the rhetorical 
problems faced by each of the presidents. A definition of an international crisis was 
applied to each situation to determine whether it satisfied the conditions of a crisis. This 
chapter will apply the characteristic of crisis rhetoric in the analysis of the three speeches 
selected for this study.
Characteristics of Crisis Rhetoric 
Bonnie J. Dow says that different situations require different discursive responses.
The discourse can be either deliberative or epideictic depending on the exigence for the 
discourse and the function that the discourse performs. According to Dow, an important 
component in the strategies applied to the discourse is the audience’s role “in defining the 
function of crisis rhetoric” (297). Dow admits that situations can also require elements of 
both epideictic and deliberative strategies in the discourse with one of the strategies 
taking prominence.
Dow, however, does not take into consideration Aristotle’s definition of deliberative 
oratory. According to Aristotle, deliberative (political) oratory concerns future actions or 
events (1335) whereas in D ow’s interpretation, presidents use deliberative strategies to 
“establish the expediency of action taken in an effort to gain public support” (296). In
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other words, presidents use deliberative strategies to convince the audience that they 
made the right decision in taking the appropriate action. This explanation would seem to 
me more like using forensic strategies which, in Aristotle’s definition, defend the actions 
already taken by presidents. While some would argue that forensic oratory takes place in 
a court room in front of a judge and possibly a jury, I would argue that the public 
audience is the jury.
The Method
The method used in this study to analyze W ilson’s and the two Bush’s speeches is to 
apply epideictic, deliberative and forensic strategies, or a combination of strategies, to the 
discourse based on the situation the rhetor faced and the needs of the audience. This 
method should result in a better understanding of whether or not the discourse was 
successful in meeting the needs of the audience, based on the different situations.
Aristotle explains that the three types of discourses are determined by the listeners of 
the speeches. He says that ceremonial (epideictic) discourse “either praises or censures 
somebody,” (1335) and the audience are merely observers. Political speaking 
(deliberative discourse) urges the audience “to do or not do something” (1335). The 
deliberative audience Aristotle referred to was made up of legislative bodies. Forensic 
discourse either “attacks or defends somebody” (1335), and the audience is found in a 
case of law, for example, a jury. Aristotle also explains that these three types of 
discourse also refer to three different periods in time. Epideictic speakers are concerned 
with the present time. Deliberative discourse concerns itself with the future, and forensic 
discourse concerns itself with the past.
39
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Celeste Michelle Condit (1985) argued that Aristotle’s classification o f epideictic 
rhetoric no longer applied to modern rhetoric because, she claims, all types o f rhetoric 
contain some measure o f praise and blame. In order for critics to understand more fully 
the functions o f epideictic rhetoric, Condit assembled a set o f shared characteristics of 
epideictic discourse. These shared characteristics included the three functional pairs o f 
“definition/understanding, shaping/sharing o f community, and display/entertainment” 
(291). This updated definition o f Aristotle’s classification of epideictic discourse allows 
the critic to address the message content o f the rhetoric more completely.
A brief discussion o f each classification o f discourse is provided prior to applying the 
strategies to the speeches.
Epideictic
According to Dow, the aim o f epideictic strategies in crisis rhetoric is to provide 
communal understanding o f what has taken place. She says that until the event is 
somehow aligned with past experiences, including communal beliefs and values, the 
community cannot completely understand the meaning of the event (297). Therefore, 
they must be given guidelines that can help them interpret the experience.
Condit says that epideictic strategies serve three functions for both the rhetor and the 
audience. These functions include “understanding and definition, sharing and creation of 
community, and entertainment and display” (284). One element o f each pair fulfills 
needs for the rhetor, and the other fulfills needs for the audience. Condit argues that 
epideictic rhetoric will include at least one set o f these functional pairs. The 
understanding and definition functional pair is said to “explain a social world” (288).
This function, Condit says, plays a critical role in declarations o f war, and allows the
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rhetor to explain an issue in terms of the audience’s frame of values and beliefs, thereby 
making the event less threatening and confusing (288). This function also serves to give 
power to the rhetor.
The functional pair of sharing and creation of community is important in epideictic 
discourse because human beings need some form of symbolic sharing. Condit says that a 
sense of community is shaped and maintained by hearing about the community’s legacy 
and character. When there is a crisis, such as war, epideictic discourse will help the 
community discover what the event means, and “what the community will come to be in 
the “face of the new event” (289).
Finally, the third functional pair of entertainment and display invites rhetors to 
present their eloquence. Condit defines “eloquence” as “a combination of truth, beauty 
and power in human speech, and is a unique capacity of humanity” (290). Although crisis 
rhetoric is not at all entertaining, the ability of rhetors to display eloquence also gives 
them credibility as a powerful leader. Eloquence, Condit says, is the manifestation of the 
qualities of truth, beauty, power, and humanness. In epideictic speeches, the audience is 
the judge of the degree of eloquence presented by the speaker.
Deliberative
Aristotle calls deliberative oratory “political speaking” (1335). He says that this type 
of speech urges the audience to take or not take a particular course of action. The speaker 
“aims at establishing the expediency or the harmfulness of the proposed course of action” 
(1335) by providing evidence that the results will be positive or negative, he urges 
acceptance or rejection. Aristotle speaks of actions that occur in the future, not those that 
have already been taken. In contrast, Dow claims that the aim of deliberative strategies in
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crisis rhetoric is to gain public support for the actions already taken (302). This type of 
discourse, according to Dow, must highlight the “deliberative characteristic of the 
process, in order to reassure a democratic society that has negative memories of secret 
wars” (302). In essence, she is not asking the audience to determine what action should 
be taken, but to support the president, whether or not the audience agrees with the action. 
This would lead to the idea that the oratory could assume a forensic approach.
Forensic
According to Aristotle, forensic oratory “either attacks or defends-somebody” (1335). 
It is the goal of the orator to establish that the action taken is either justified or not. 
Modem presidents who face international crisis use their executive powers to act prior to 
convincing Congress or the public of the necessity to take military action against an 
unprovoked attack on innocent people. The ultimate objective is to convince the 
Congress and the public that their actions were justified.
The examination of each of the texts will show that each of the strategies, epideictic 
strategies that Dow describes as fulfilling a function of allowing the audiences to 
understand the events that have occurred, deliberative strategies that urge a specific 
course of action, and forensic strategies that convince the audience that the only course of 
action that could have been pursued was justified, are present in presidential international 
crisis rhetoric.
W ilson’s April 2, 1917, Speech
In my opinion, Woodrow Wilson was the most eloquent of the three presidents whose 
speeches are analyzed in this study. A scholar of rhetoric, Wilson is credited with 
changing how presidents communicated with Congress and the American public. James
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w. Ceaser, Glen E. Thurow, Jeffrey Tulis and Joseph M. Bessette say that W ilson’s view 
of presidential speech is that it should articulate what is in peoples’ hearts (9). They state 
that:
The Wilsonian concept of the rhetorical presidency consists of two 
interfused elements. First, the President should employ oratory to create an 
active public opinion that, if necessary, will pressure the Congress into 
accepting his program: ‘he [the President] has no means of compelling 
Congress except through public opinion.’ In advancing policy, 
deliberative, intra-branch rhetoric thus becomes secondary to popular 
rhetoric, and the president speaks to Congress not directly, but through his 
popular addresses. Second, in order to reach and move the public, the 
character of the rhetoric must tap the public’s feelings and articulate its 
wishes. (10)
W ilson’s April 2, 1917, speech to Congress asking for a declaration of war against 
Germany not only reiterates the events that have lead up to the need for the discourse, but 
also reveals strategies that Dow says assigns a communal meaning to the events. The 
beginning of W ilson’s speech reveals Condit’s definition/understanding functional pair. 
At the start of his speech. President Wilson describes the events that have taken place 
over the preceding two months during which German submarines had sunk ships in the 
Mediterranean. Wilson wanted to keep America out of the war, but there no longer 
seemed a choice. While innocent American lives were being taken,
Vessels of every kind, whatever their flag, their character, their cargo, 
their destination, their errand, have been ruthlessly sent to the bottom [of
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the sea] without warning and without thought of help or mercy for those 
on board, the vessels of friendly neutrals along with those of belligerents 
[sic]. Even hospital ships and ships carrying relief to the sorely bereaved 
and stricken people of Belgium, though the latter were provided with safe 
conduct through the proscribed areas by the German Government itself 
and were distinguished by unmistakable marks of identity, have been sunk 
with the same reckless lack of compassion or of principle, (par. 2)
Dow contends that even though the majority of the audience may not be involved in 
the crisis, there is still a need for communal understanding because of the confusion 
created by the events. The nation as a whole needs to understand how the nation will 
proceed. In addition, there is a need for the discourse to “disassociate the nation from 
responsibility for the crisis” (297). Wilson points out that American ships, “vessels of 
every kind . . . vessels of friendly neutrals . . . hospital ships” were sunk, not by ships 
manned by Americans, but by the Germans.
Wilson describes the infiltration of spies to America at the beginning of the war that 
were under the “direction of official agents of the Imperial Government accredited to the 
Government of the United States” (par. 12). It is not America’s fault that it has been put 
in a position of defending its freedom and democracy, nor is it the fault of the people of 
Germany “but only in the selfish designs of a Government that did what it pleased and 
told its people nothing” (par. 12). He tells his audience that the German government has 
no intent on being a friend to the United States, and that it will “act against our peace and 
security at its convenience” (par. 12).
Wilson describes neutrality as “no longer feasible or desirable where the peace of the
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world is involved and the freedom of its peoples, and the menace to that peace and 
freedom lies in the existence of autocratic governments backed by organized force which 
is controlled wholly by their will, not by the will of their people” (par. 8). He reminds his 
audience that it is not the fault of the German people, but of their government. He says, 
“We have no feeling towards them but one of sympathy and friendship,” and reminds 
them that the German government made the decision to take their country to war, “war 
determined upon as wars used to be determined upon in the old, unhappy days when 
peoples were nowhere consulted by their rulers and wars were provoked and waged in the 
interest of dynasties or of little groups of ambitious men who were accustomed to use 
their fellow men as pawns and tools” (par. 9).
Wilson believed that it was the president’s responsibility to use presidential rhetorical 
power to instill in the minds of an American community the “meaning of America” 
(Andrews 132). In many of his speeches to the American public, Wilson “stressed the 
need for unity and expanded and refined our notions of uniqueness” (132). America was 
considered a “melting pot” of all nations. Andrews discusses the Americanization 
movement, describing it as reflecting “a feeling that homogeneity was a prerequisite of 
true unity and thus true nationhood” (136). Wilson furthered clarified this concept in his 
speech The Heroes o f  Vera Cruz when he said:
Notice how truly these men were of our blood. I mean of our American 
blood, which is not drawn from any one country, which is not drawn from 
any one stock, which is not drawn from language of the modem world; but 
free men everywhere have sent their sons and their brothers and their 
daughters to this country in order to make a compounded Nation [sic]
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which consists of all the sturdy elements and all of the best elements of the 
whole globe. (104)
In his first inaugural address, Wilson defined American standards as those of “justice and 
fair play” (3). Then, in a speech at Soldier’s Memorial Hall, Pittsburg, on January 29, 
1916, Wilson stated, “America was bom into the world to do mankind service, and no 
man [sic] is a true American in whom the desire to do mankind service does not take 
precedence over the desire to serve him self’ (26).
We can identify early in W ilson’s speech the functional pair of shaping and sharing of 
community. Wilson talks about honor and democracy, and argues that, “only free peoples 
can hold their purpose and their honour [sic] steady to a common end and prefer the 
interests of mankind to any narrow interest of their own (par. 10). This passage serves to 
remind the audience of the American values that Wilson defined throughout his 
presidential rhetoric. Then, Wilson introduces “a fit partner for a league of honour” [sic] 
(par. 11) when he talks about how Russian people are fighting for freedom, justice and 
peace in the world. He asks, “Does not every American feel assurance has been added to 
our hope for the future [. . .]? ” (par. I I )  as a result of what was happening in Russia.
This gives a sense of sharing to the audience.
What Wilson needed to achieve next was to describe what the role of the United 
States and its people entailed. He stated, “We are but one of the champions of the rights 
of mankind” (par. 13). America would fight for world freedom and ultimate world 
peace, even for the German people. The United States, he says, will continue to,
fight for the things which we have always carried nearest our hearts -  for 
democracy, for the right of those who submit to authority to have a voice
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in their own governments, for the rights and liberties of small nations, for 
a universal dominion of right by such a concert of free peoples as shall 
bring peace and safety to all nations and make the world itself at last free, 
(par. 13)
Wilson also addressed the fact that many German bom people living in the United States 
will continue to be treated with friendship and respect. Speaking to the good of the 
American people, he describes them as, “most of them, as true and loyal Americans as if 
they had never known any other fealty or allegiance. They will be prompt to stand with 
us in rebuking and restraining the few who may be of a different mind and purpose” (16). 
Yet, he also warns, “If there should be disloyalty, it will be dealt with with a firm hand of 
stem repression; but, if it lifts its head at all, it will lift it only here and there and without 
countenance except from a lawless and malignant few” (par. 16).
Finally, Wilson advises Congress that there are many sacrifices that will be made by 
Americans. He states that while the act of war is frightening, especially for people who 
have lived in a peaceful democracy, he believes that “civilization itse lf’ seems to be in 
the balance (par. 17). Wilson concludes by repeating the values of the American people 
by stating.
We shall fight for the things which we have always carried nearest our 
hearts -  for democracy, for the right of those who submit to authority to 
have a voice in their own govemments, for the rights and liberties of small 
nations, for a universal dominion of right by such a concert of free peoples 
as shall bring peace and safety to all nations and make the world itself at 
last free. (par. 17)
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President W ilson’s speech using the epideictic function of crisis rhetoric also fulfilled 
Condit definition of “eloquence,” which is evidenced in the press’ assessment of the 
speech as summarized by The New York Times on April 3, 1917. The Times ran excerpts 
from 26 newspapers in 18 cities across the United States. A headline from The New York 
City Tribune states, ‘“ No Praise too High’ for W ilson.” The paper is quoted as saying 
“The judgments of the moment are frequently of but transitory value. Yet, reading 
President W ilson’s message to Congress at the moment of its delivery to Congress, it 
seems one of the great documents of history, re-echoing in a new and yet the original 
spirit, the great words of Lincoln, ‘With malice to none.’” The Providence Journal called 
the speech “A Most Noble Utterance, “ and The Baltimore American called the speech as 
one of “the most impressive human appeals ever delivered.”
In the effort to convince the Congress to declare war against Germany, Wilson also 
uses deliberative strategies. He explains that his previous request to Congress on 
February 26, 1917, that America’s ships arm themselves to defend against any attacks by 
the Germans at sea, appears to be impractical (par. 5). He further explains that the United 
States has no choice but to defend itself against attacks by stating, “Armed neutrality is 
ineffectual enough at best; in such circumstances and in the face of such pretensions it is 
worse than ineffectual; it is likely only to produce what it was meant to prevent; it is 
practically certain to draw us into the war without either the rights or the effectiveness of 
belligerents” (par. 5). Wilson believed that America was better off taking a strong 
position against the enemy because of its mission to lead and serve mankind in the quest 
for freedom.
While Wilson used his rhetorical talents to convince Congress to declare war on
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Germany, George H. W. Bush faced the challenge of convincing the American public 
that, in his role as Commander-in-Chief, he had taken appropriate military action in 
Kuwait. This situation is examined next as we apply the forensic framework to George 
H. W. Bush’s speech.
George H. W. Bush’s January 16, 1991, Speech
As presented in Chapter 3, George H. W. Bush’s rhetorical problem was the public’s 
perception that American involvement in an attack on a foreign country by another 
foreign country would be like America’s long involvement in Viet Nam. President Bush 
needed to convince the American public that, under the circumstances of the situation, 
the decision to send American troops to the Middle East is justified and that America 
would not experience another Viet Nam.
Bush began his speech by notifying the audience of the action already taken on 
military targets in Iraq and Kuwait. Unlike Wilson, Bush addressed the public through 
mass media - national television and radio - recounting the activities of Saddam 
Hussein’s invasion and occupation of Kuwait. He also outlined the diplomatic activities 
of the United States along with the United Nations, and many other countries to restore 
order and peace to the Middle East. Bush said that people from other nations also tried to 
reason with Hussein, to no avail, leaving no choice “but to drive Saddam from Kuwait by 
force” (par. 4).
He continued his remarks to inform the audience of the military activities occurring in 
Iraq as he spoke. He furthered the rationale by telling the audience of the intent to destroy 
Hussein’s arsenal of artillery, and nuclear and chemical weapons, in order to protect the
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lives of the coalition forces. Bush also posed the questions of “Why act now? Why not 
wait?” (par. 7) in anticipation of what he though the public would ask. Saying that, “The 
world could wait no longer” (par. 7), he began to explain the situation that required the 
actions currently in progress, in answer to those questions.
Using an effective technique of repetition. Bush explains what had occurred to 
reinforce the need to act. He stated:
While the world waited, Saddam Hussein systematically raped, 
pillaged, and plundered a tiny nation, no threat to his own. He subjected 
the people of Kuwait to unspeakable atrocities -  and among those maimed 
and murdered, innocent children, (par.8)
While the world waited, Saddam sought to add to the chemical 
weapons arsenal he now possesses, an infinitely more dangerous weapon 
of mass destruction — a nuclear weapon. And while the world waited, 
while the world talked peace and withdrawal, Saddam Hussein dug in and 
moved massive forces into Kuwait, (par. 9)
While the world waited, while Saddam stalled, more damage was 
being done to the fragile economies of the Third World, emerging 
democracies of Eastern Europe, to the entire world, including to our own 
economy, (par. 10)
While the world waited, Saddam Hussein met every overture of peace 
with open contempt. While the world prayed for peace, Saddam prepared 
for war. (par. 12)
The first piece of evidence offered to justify this military action speaks to the basic
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values of life in America. Crimes against innocent children are incomprehensible. A 
crime against a child brings mothers and fathers together to punish the offender. Then, 
Imagine the fear created by the thought of America as we know it the target of a nuclear 
bomb! This is another piece of evidence to justify sending troops to Kuwait. Sending 
our troops to defeat the enemy was the only choice he had. While not wanting this action 
to seem to be about money. Bush did make a plea to the common sense of the people that 
our economy was just as much at risk as that of the Middle Eastern countries who were 
adopting American values. Finally, Bush portrays Hussein as a war monger and the rest 
of the world as a peace loving people.
Bush explains the that the action was rational by saying that, when Hussein was 
repeatedly warned by the United Nations to either leave Kuwait or he would come under 
attack, “ [Saddam] has arrogantly rejected all warnings. Instead, he tried to make this a 
dispute between Iraq and the United States of America” (par. 14).
In his attempt to reassure the American public that he did not want a prolonged battle 
that resulted in the loss of American lives on foreign soil. Bush said;
Prior to ordering our forces into battle, I instructed our military 
commanders to take every necessary step to prevail as quickly as possible, 
and with the greatest degree of protection possible for American and allied 
service men and women. I ’ve told the American people before that this 
will not be another Vietnam, and I repeat this here tonight. Our troops will 
have the best possible support in the entire world, and they will not be 
asked to fight with one hand tied behind their back. I ’m hopeful that this
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fighting will not go on for long and that casualties will be held to an 
absolute minimum, (par. 16)
As stated earlier in this paper, American’s feelings against the war in Vietnam were 
still strong. In the preceding passage. Bush reassures Americans that he is doing 
everything he can to keep the soldiers safe. Yet, as all people know, lives will be lost, 
regardless of his instructions to military commanders.
An important part of this crisis rhetoric is to assure the audience that all is being done 
to make sure that the loss of life will be minimal, and that American soldiers believe in 
the action. Bush uses remarks from a number of the soldiers to show support for the 
military action described in his discourse. He says.
Listen to Hollywood Huddleston, Marine lance corporal. He says, ‘Let’s 
free these people, so we can go home and be free again;’ Listen to one of, 
our great officers out there. Marine Lieutenant General Walter Boomer.
He said: ‘There are things worth fighting for. A world in which brutality 
and lawlessness are allowed to go unchecked isn’t the kind of world w e’re 
going to want to live in;’ Listen to Master Sergeant J.P. Kendall of the 82d 
Airborne: ‘W e’re here for more than just the price of a gallon of gas. What 
w e’re doing is going to chart the future of the world for the next 100 years. 
It’s better to deal with this guy now than 5 years from now;’ and we 
should all sit up and listen to Jackie Jones, an Army lieutenant, when she 
says, ‘If we let him get away with this, who knows what’s going to be 
next’? (pars.2 1 - 24).
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This passage speaks to the character of Americans and our beliefs in freedom, 
democracy, and responsibility as world leaders.
Analysis of this speech revealed that we can add a third framework to the study of 
presidential international crisis rhetoric. In fairness to Dow, this discourse was delivered 
after her 1989 study. It does not fit into the definition of deliberative rhetoric because it 
was delivered after a decision was made and to gain support for having made the 
decision. However, the next piece of rhetorical discourse offers examples of deliberative 
as well as forensic and epideictic strategies.
George W. Bush’s September 20, 2001, Speech 
On September I I ,  2001, America was attacked by a faceless enemy and its citizens 
were shocked, confused and frightened. We looked to the country’s leader. President 
George W. Bush, to explain to us why these attacks occurred and what we were going to 
do next. The President’s speech from the Whitehouse the night of the attacks was weak.
A report in the New York Times stated that “advisors to the administration said the 
speech fell flat, that it failed to meet either the magnitude of the day’s events or the nature 
of the task ahead” (Sanger and Van Natta Jr.). Bush’s speech writers composed a speech 
to be read at the National Cathedral three days later, yet it too did not meet expectations. 
New York Times reporter D. T. Max stated that, “the beautiful speech sounded borrowed 
coming from Bush’s mouth.” However, the speech that Bush prepared with his writers 
and delivered on September 20, 2001 to a national television audience and members of 
Congress was “a fitting response” (Bitzer 10) to the September I Ith attacks on America. 
Americans needed their President to explain the events of September I I ,  2001. We
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knew that passenger airliners flew into buildings and a field, causing explosions, fire and 
the loss of lives, but we did not know why and we did not know what to do. We needed
answers. Condit says, “Whenever change intrudes into the community’s life, the
epideictic speaker will be called forth by the community to help discover what the event 
means to the community, and what the community will come to be in the face of the new 
event” (289). Justly, Dow tells us that epideictic rhetoric is a fitting response for a 
national crisis because “the community has experienced a loss” (297).
According to Condit, epideictic speeches contain elements of praise and blame. “The 
community renews its conception of good and evil by explaining what is has previously 
held to be good or evil and by working through relationships of those past values and 
beliefs with new situations” (291). Bush says.
On September the 11th, enemies of freedom committed an act of war 
against our country. Americans have known wars — but for the past 136 
years, they have been wars on foreign soil, except for one Sunday in 1941. 
Americans have known the casualties of war — but not at the center of a 
great city on a peaceful morning. Americans have known surprise attacks -
- but never before on thousands of civilians. All of this was brought upon 
us in a single day — and night fell on a different world, a world where 
freedom itself is under attack, (par. 11)
The first functional pair of epideictic rhetoric, definition and understanding is 
evidenced in Bush’s speech. He helps us to understand the situation, not only by 
acknowledging what happened, but also what was going to happen by including the 
questions Americans were asking in his discourse: “who attacked our country?” (par. 12),
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“why do they hate us?” (par. 23), “how will we fight and win this war?” (par. 27), and 
“what is expected of us?” (par. 35).
In answer to the first question of who attacked us. Bush begins building a case against 
a group of terrorists known al Qaeda and its leader, Osama bin Laden. He tells his 
audience of the organization’s extreme differences to our community’s values of freedom 
and peace. Bush states, “AI Qaeda is to terror what the mafia is to crime. But its goal is 
not making money; its goal is remaking the world — and imposing its radical beliefs on 
people everywhere” (par. 13). Then he says, “The terrorists’ directive commands them to 
kill Christians and Jews, to kill all Americans, and make no distinction among military 
and civilians, including women and children” (par. 14).
The second question Bush posses is, “why do they hate us?” The answer to this 
question is not only for Americans, but for people in other countries who share some of 
the same values. He begins by addressing the American people with, “They hate what we 
see right here in this chamber — a democratically elected government. Their leaders are 
self-appointed. They hate our freedoms — our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, 
our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each other” (par. 23). Then, he 
speaks to his national audience and says, “They want to overthrow existing govemments 
in many Muslim countries, such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan. They want to drive 
Israel out of the Middle East. They want to drive Christians and Jews out of vast regions 
of Asia and Africa” (par. 24). He turns back to Americans and says that the terrorists 
want to end a way of life and by their horrific actions, hope that America will retreat from 
its position as a powerful nation (par. 25). For me, the answer for America to this 
question is simply -  they hate our freedoms.
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It is with Bush’s answer to the third question where I argue that the rhetoric changes 
its strategy from epideictic to forensic. “How will we fight and win this war?” asks Bush 
on behalf of the American people. This is the point where Bush tells America and the 
world what has already been done.
Today, dozens of federal departments and agencies, as well as state 
and local governments, have responsibilities affecting homeland security.
These efforts must be coordinated at the highest level. So tonight I 
announce the creation of a Cabinet-level position reporting directly to me 
- the Office of Homeland Security. Many will be involved in this effort, 
from FBI agents to intelligence operatives to the reservists we have called 
to active duty. . . And tonight, a few miles from the damaged Pentagon, I 
have a message for our military: Be ready. I ’ve called the Armed Forces 
to alert, and there is a reason. The hour is coming when America will act, 
and you will make us proud, (pars. 29 and 31)
In essence. Bush has just put us on notice that we are, again, at war in a foreign land. He 
told his audience that the war was not going to end quickly, and it would involve 
Americans losing their lives in combat. He says, “Americans should not expect one 
battle, but a lengthy campaign, unlike any other we have ever seen. It may include 
dramatic strikes, visible on TV, and covert operations, secret even in success” (par. 28).
Bush began making his case early in the speech when he states, “Tonight we are a 
country awakened to danger and called to defend freedom. Our grief has turned to anger, 
and anger to resolution. Whether we bring our enemies to justice, or bring justice to our 
enemies, justice will be done” (par. 5).
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Dow says that effective discourse must clearly show that the action is legal, justified 
by the situation, and prudent (306). Bush points out that all of the evidence gathered 
points to al Qaeda, the same group that had been indicted for the bombings of the USS 
Cole and American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania (par. 12). He also states that, “The 
leadership of al Qaeda has great influence in Afghanistan and supports the Taliban 
regime in controlling most of that country. In Afghanistan, we see al Qaeda’s vision for 
the world” (par. 16). Bush makes his point very clear. “Our war on terror begins with al 
Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach 
has been found, stopped and defeated” (par. 22). He says later in the speech, “These 
measures are essential. But the only way to defeat terrorism as a threat to our way of life 
is to stop it, eliminate it, and destroy it where it grows” (par. 31).
Finally, Bush answers the forth question: “What is expected of us?” He then uses 
deliberative strategies as he advises Americans “to live their lives, and hug your children” 
(par. 35) even though there is fear and trepidation. He asks them to “uphold the values of 
America” (par. 35) to continue supporting the victims of the tragedy, cooperate with 
investigators, and be patient with tightened security measures. Bush has just reunited the 
country.
Moving back to epideictic strategies, most surprisingly. Bush also satisfies Condit’s 
third functional pair of epideictic discourse, display and entertainment. Bush used this 
strategy to identify with the audience and help them feel a sense of community by a 
display of compassion. Bush held up the badge of police officer, George Howard, a hero 
who died trying to save victims of the World Trade Center bombings. Bush says, “It [the 
badge] was given to me by his mom, Arlene, as a proud memorial to her son. This is my
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reminder of lives that ended, and a task that does not end. I will not forget this wound to 
our country or those who inflicted it. I will not yield; I will not rest; I will not relent in 
waging this struggle for freedom and security for the American people” (pars. 50 and 51). 
Condit says that, “Many ceremonial occasions invite the speaker to display her or his 
eloquence. ‘Eloquence’ is the combination of truth, beauty and power in human speech, 
and is a unique capacity of humanity” . . . The audience is ‘entertained’ by such speech in 
a most humane manner . . . allowed to stretch their daily experience into meaning more 
grand, sweet, [and] noble . . (290). Equally important, Condit says, is that, “audiences 
rightfully take eloquence as a sign of leadership” (291). According to Max, Bush 
succeeded in showing the country and the world at large that he was a strong leader. The 
speech was deemed “a good and strong speech” by John F. Kennedy’s speech writer, Ted 
Sorensen (Max 8).
Condit’s functional pair of shaping and sharing community in epideictic rhetoric is 
also apparent in the speech. Bush gives us a sense of community by talking about the 
“courage of passengers, who rushed terrorists to save others on the ground,” “the 
endurance of rescue workers, working past exhaustion,” “the unfurling of flags, the 
lighting of candles, the giving of blood, the saying of prayers,” and “giving and loving 
people who have made the grief of strangers their own” (pars. 2-3). He brings to the 
forefront American values of strength, freedom and justice. Dow says, “The community 
renews its conception of itself and of what is good by explaining what it has previously 
held to be good and by working through the relationships of those past values and beliefs 
to new situations (289).
Bush’s speech was able to explain to Americans what occurred on September 11,
58
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2001, on American soil, to reunite Americans as a community with shared beliefs and 
values, and to also persuade the world at large that the actions against the terrorists 
responsible for the destruction of property in America and the taking of human lives 
throughout the world was the right course of action. Bush had managed to calm the 
people of America and establish himself as their leader. According to Max, “Ted 
Kennedy said, ‘The president’s speech was exactly what the nation needed -  a message 
of determination and hope, strength and compassion’” (7).
Conclusion
This chapter has analyzed three speeches from three United States Presidents who 
faced three different situations, calling for three different responses. W ilson’s speech 
employed epideictic and deliberative strategies to convince Congress to declare war on 
Germany. George H. W. Bush’s speech employed epideictic and forensic strategies to 
justify to the American people the actions taken in the Persian Gulf, and I have 
demonstrated that George W. Bush’s speech employed epideictic, forensic and 
deliberative strategies
When we apply a specific strategic theory to discourse, epideictic, forensic, or 
deliberative, we are better able to understand how the discourse responds to different 
crisis situations, as well as how it relates to the needs of different audiences.
The next chapter will discuss the results of the research and analysis of these three 
pieces of presidential international crisis rhetoric. Also included is a comparison of the 
language used by each of the rhetors.
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CHAPTER 5
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Presidential rhetoric has become one of the ways in which our nation’s leaders can 
become more “human” in the eyes and ears of the American public, and to show their 
strength as leaders. Presidents use rhetoric to persuade the people to accept their 
responses or actions to various situations. As previously noted, Karlyn Kohrs Campbell 
and Kathleen Hall Jamieson stated that modem presidential rhetoric has produced various 
forms of discourse (genres) that preserve the institution of the office, while adapting it to 
particular times and conditions (4). During times of crisis, the American public looks to 
a president for assurance that everything will eventually be alright. Americans want an 
explanation of what happened, why it happened, and what the president will do, or has 
done, about it, and what the people will need to do next. How presidents articulate their 
message to their audience can have either negative or positive affects on their credibility 
as leader.
The study of presidential crisis rhetoric is important not only for the critic, but also 
for the rhetor. As Edwin Black points out, rhetors can draw upon historical responses to 
similar situations. The three speeches analyzed in this study support this concept and 
assist in answering the first question posed at the beginning of this study. The question 
was, “Is rhetorical history being repeated each time a situation occurs where the United
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States is faced with a threat to its position as the world’s most powerful nation?” Critics 
are able to understand how this type of discourse is impacted by situational components 
by using certain strategies in the discourse to create an effective response to the situation.
The purpose of this study was to add to the study of presidential rhetoric presented 
during times of international crises in order to determine whether the discourses share 
similar situational and strategic elements that are characteristic of crisis rhetoric as 
reported by Bonnie Dow in 1987. Dow argues that it is important to clarify the 
relationship of crisis rhetoric and the classical genres of epideictic and deliberative 
discourse in order to understand the function of the discourse as it responds to.a particular 
situation (297). This study reveals that presidential international crisis rhetoric uses 
epideictic strategies in conjunction with deliberative strategies, or with deliberative and 
forensic strategies, in order for the discourse to be effective.
Each of the situations leading up to the delivery of the discourse analyzed in this 
study shared the components of an international crisis as defined by Murray Edelman, 
who states that a crisis is a threat that people must face together, and that a crisis suggests 
a need for unity and common sacrifice (45). President Woodrow Wilson needed to 
respond to a situation where innocent Americans were killed on international waters by 
enemies of freedom. Tensions between America and the German government had been 
building over the course of three years. When all diplomatic attempts failed to protect 
innocent people of the world. President Wilson realized that America could no longer 
allow Germany to destroy America’s basic principles of democracy and the rights of all 
people to live in peace and safety. His request to Congress to declare war on Germany 
and support sending troops to help fight for freedom of all people.
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Likewise, George H. W. Bush faced a situation where diplomatic attempts to protect 
Middle Eastern countries safe from military attacks by the maniacal leader of Iraq, 
Saddam Hussein, failed. When Hussein’s military forces invaded the small country of 
Kuwait, Bush’s decision to send American troops to defend the freedoms of the innocent 
people in Kuwait required the president to address the people of America and the rest of 
the world to explain that he needed to involve the American military in order to protect 
the basis values of freedom and democracy.
While unlike W ilson’s and George H. W. Bush’s situations of military actions 
abroad, newly elected President George W. Bush faced a situation involving an unknown 
enemy attacking innocent people on American soil. The attacks on the World Trade 
Center Towers in New York City and the Pentagon in Washington, D C. were witnessed 
by the television viewing audience as they occurred. Americans also saw the destruction 
of another commercial airliner that had crashed in a field near Pittsburg, Pennsylvania. It 
was some time before President Bush was able to deliver a speech that would help 
American’s to understand what had happened, why it happened, and what was going to 
happen next.
Kiewe states that presidential crisis rhetoric characterizes “a unique and dynamic 
process” (xvii). In order for presidents to display strong leadership qualities during 
situations of crisis, they need to deliver discourse that offers comfort and understanding, 
solutions to the problem or problems people will face, unite the people by addressing 
basic ideals and principals, and offer justification for actions taken (Kiewe xviii). The 
Analysis of the speeches by Wilson, Bush, and Bush reveals common characteristics of 
presidential crisis rhetoric, and answers another question posed in this study, “Are claims
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by Dow, Campbell, Jamieson, and others concerning similarities in situation, strategic 
response and needs of the audience evident in the documents?” This question has just 
been addressed in part. The answer to the remainder of this question is provided in the 
following synopses of the speeches.
W ilson’s speech to Congress asking for a declaration of war on Germany begins with 
an account of the events leading up to the need for this piece of discourse. He described 
the situation to Congress, telling of the attacks on innocent people in international waters 
near Europe, including killing non-combatant Americans. He reminds Congress that 
American citizens came from all countries to help shape the nation’s identity, and that 
America basic values were democracy and peace. Wilson also describes the purpose of 
being an American -  to champion the cause for peace and freedom throughout the world. 
These portions of the rhetoric serve to unite the people of America. Wilson also explains 
that America has no choice to go to war to ensure that democracy and peace prevail, and 
that there will be sacrifices to protect basic human rights. Wilson was confident in the 
strength of America as a world leader, and that, while he attempted to use diplomatic 
strategies, the only choice that was left was to join in the battle against an enemy of 
humankind. It was evident that the rhetoric fulfilled the needs of the audience by the 
responses from the pubic as reported in newspapers around the country.
When George H. W. Bush’s discourse was examined, it was found that the situation 
required the president to not only assure the American public that his actions against 
Saddam Hussein were justified, but that American soldiers sent to the Middle East would 
be protected and brought home quickly. America was remembering the war in Viet Nam, 
and would not support similar involvement by the United States military. Bush had to
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convince the public that he had tried everything he could diplomatically to protect the 
peace in the world. In recounting the actions of Hussein, he played upon the hearts of all 
Americans by describing the crimes against children and innocent people of a small 
country unable to defend itself. Bush had no choice but to send help. He effectively 
assured the American audience that the soldiers who had been asked to fight for the right 
of human freedom supported his actions. He presented a number of testimonials from the 
soldiers who were sent to Kuwait to fight for American values of freedom, democracy 
and responsibility as world leaders. While Bush did not display the eloquence of Wilson, 
his speech did satisfy both epideictic and forensic characteristics found in crisis rhetoric.
The least eloquent speaker of the three was George W. Bush, and he faced the 
difficult task of explaining the situation that occurred on September I I ,  2001, to a 
frightened, confused, and shocked America. While most of the people in America and 
around the world witnessed the events on local and national television. President Bush 
still had to explain what happened. More importantly, he needed to explain why it 
happened and who was responsible. Bush also needed to explain to the people what 
actions America was taking to find the person who committed the act, and at the same 
time, tell the people in America how to go on living their lives after the attacks. Bush 
began by describing the unity of people coming together to help the victims of the 
attacks, and describing the unity of elected officials coming together on the steps of the 
capital building, not as members of two different political parties, but as Americans. He 
then introduced what he believed all people would ask him to explain - what happened 
and why? While he responded to his own questions, he began to create a picture of what 
terrorism and terrorist were, and how terrorists did not value democracy and freedom and
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peace. Then, Bush’s strategy changes in order to explain the actions he has already taken 
to protect America from another attack. He notified his audience that America was again 
at war in a foreign country, and it was going to last a long time. American lives would be 
sacrificed for the sake of freedom and justice. He assured Americans that the enemy, 
who was responsible for other terrorist attacks on American embassies in Kenya and 
Tanzania, and the bombing of the USS Cole had been identified, would be tracked down 
and eliminated. He again changed his strategy to tell Americans what they needed to do 
next. He told them to value their families and loved ones, to continue to support and help 
the victims of the attacks, to be patient with the new security measures, and to continue to 
believe in the basis values of America. President Bush fulfilled the needs of his 
audience, calming the people in America and establishing himself as a leader.
Conclusion
Dow argues that crisis rhetoric, depending on the situation, requires the use of either 
predominately epideictic or predominately deliberative strategies. This study has shown 
that in each situation, the president used epideictic strategies to explain the situation, but 
also used either or both deliberative or forensic strategies to make the rhetoric effective. 
For example, W ilson’s speech, eliminating the portions of his rhetoric implemented 
deliberative strategies to convince Congress to declare war on Germany would have 
resulted in failure. Likewise, George H. W. Bush needed to persuade the American 
public that his decision to attack Iraq was in the best interest of freedom for all people. 
Although this speech included the use of epideictic strategies present in all crisis rhetoric, 
forensic strategies were used to defend actions he had already taken. Finally, George W.
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Bush faced the situation of not only using his rhetoric to comfort American citizens by 
the use of epideictic strategies, and of using forensic strategies to explain the actions 
taken, his discourse also used deliberative strategies to reunited Americans by explaining 
what they should do next.
Dow made the distinction that epideictic rhetoric should not be treated as a specific 
genre, but referred to as a certain strategy that serves a specific function, and that 
deliberative rhetoric is not limited to discuss policy (308) but is also used as a strategy in 
certain situations. However, Dow limited the strategies found in presidential crisis 
rhetoric to only those of epideictic and deliberative. This study of presidential 
international crisis rhetoric offers evidence that more than one type of strategy may be 
required because of the situation leading up to the rhetorical discourse, which is 
important in extending the a critic’s approach in analyzing presidential international crisis 
rhetoric.
This brings us to the last question presented for this study, “Does this study offer 
opportunities for further research?” The answer is yes. The people of America will 
continue to experience the consequences of decisions made by our country’s leaders in 
Washington, D.C. The United States is currently at war with terrorism, and our country’s 
military forces are fighting for the freedom of people in Iraq. These situations will 
demand that President George W. Bush continue to reassure people in American and the 
world at large that he is doing what is necessary for the good of all people, based on 
America’s basic value of freedom for all. Critics of presidential crisis rhetoric will find, 
through the study of speeches yet to be delivered, that the discourse will employ
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epideictic strategies in combination with deliberative and forensic strategies to fulfill the 
purpose of the discourse.
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APPENDIX I
President Woodrow Wilson's W ar Message 
Delivered 2 April, 1917
Gentlemen of the Congress:
I have called the Congress into extraordinary session because there are serious, very 
serious, choices of policy to be made, and made immediately, which it was neither right 
nor constitutionally permissible that I should assume the responsibility of making.
On the 3d of February last I officially laid before you the extraordinary 
announcement of the Imperial German Government that on and after the 1st day of 
February it was its purpose to put aside all restraints of law or of humanity and use its 
submarines to sink every vessel that sought to approach either the ports of Great Britain 
and Ireland or the western coasts of Europe or any of the ports controlled by the enemies 
of Germany within the Mediterranean. That had seemed to be the object of the German 
submarine warfare earlier in the war, but since April of last year the Imperial 
Government had somewhat restrained the commanders of its undersea craft in conformity 
with its promise then given to us that passenger boats should not be sunk and that due 
warning would be given to all other vessels which its submarines might seek to destroy, 
when no resistance was offered or escape attempted, and care taken that their crews were 
given at least a fair chance to save their lives in their open boats. The precautions taken
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were meagre and haphazard enough, as was proved in distressing instance after instance 
in the progress of the cruel and unmanly business, but a certain degree of restraint was 
observed The new policy has swept every restriction aside. Vessels of every kind, 
whatever their flag, their character, their cargo, their destination, their errand, have been 
ruthlessly sent to the bottom without warning and without thought of help or mercy for 
those on board, the vessels of friendly neutrals along with those of belligerents. Even 
hospital ships and ships carrying relief to the sorely bereaved and stricken people of 
Belgium, though the latter were provided with safe-conduct through the proscribed areas 
by the German Government itself and were distinguished by unmistakable marks of 
identity, have been sunk with the same reckless lack of compassion or of principle.
I was for a little while unable to believe that such things would in fact be done by any 
government that had hitherto subscribed to the humane practices of civilized nations. 
International law had its origin in the at tempt to set up some law which would be 
respected and observed upon the seas, where no nation had right of dominion and where 
lay the free highways of the world. By painful stage after stage has that law been built up, 
with meagre enough results, indeed, after all was accomplished that could be 
accomplished, but always with a clear view, at least, of what the heart and conscience of 
mankind demanded. This minimum of right the German Government has swept aside 
under the plea of retaliation and necessity and because it had no weapons which it could 
use at sea except these which it is impossible to employ as it is employing them without 
throwing to the winds all scruples of humanity or of respect for the understandings that 
were supposed to underlie the intercourse of the world. I am not now thinking of the loss 
of property involved, immense and serious as that is, but only of the wanton and
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wholesale destruction of the lives of noncombatants, men, women, and children, engaged 
in pursuits which have always, even in the darkest periods of modem history, been 
deemed innocent and legitimate. Property can be paid for; the lives of peaceful and 
innocent people can not be. The present German submarine warfare against commerce is 
a warfare against mankind.
It is a war against all nations. American ships have been sunk, American lives taken, 
in ways which it has stirred us very deeply to learn of, but the ships and people of other 
neutral and friendly nations have been sunk and overwhelmed in the waters in the same 
way. There has been no discrimination. The challenge is to all mankind. Each nation 
must decide for itself how it will meet it. The choice we make for ourselves must be 
made with a moderation of counsel and a temperateness of judgment befitting our 
character and our motives as a nation. We must put excited feeling away. Our motive will 
not be revenge or the victorious assertion of the physical might of the nation, but only the 
vindication of right, of human right, of which we are only a single champion.
When I addressed the Congress on the 26th of Eebruary last, I thought that it would 
suffice to assert our neutral rights with arms, our right to use the seas against unlawful 
interference, our right to keep our people safe against unlawful violence. But armed 
neutrality, it now appears, is impracticable. Because submarines are in effect outlaws 
when used as the German submarines have been used against merchant shipping, it is 
impossible to defend ships against their attacks as the law of nations has assumed that 
merchantmen would defend themselves against privateers or cruisers, visible craft giving 
chase upon the open sea. It is common prudence in such circumstances, grim necessity 
indeed, to endeavour to destroy them before they have shown their own intention. They
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must be dealt with upon sight, if dealt with at all. The German Government denies the 
right of neutrals to use arms at all within the areas of the sea which it has proscribed, 
even in the defense of rights which no modem publicist has ever before questioned their 
right to defend. The intimation is conveyed that the armed guards which we have placed 
on our merchant ships will be treated as beyond the pale of law and subject to be dealt 
with as pirates would be. Armed neutrality is ineffectual enough at best; in such 
circumstances and in the face of such pretensions it is worse than ineffectual; it is likely 
only to produce what it was meant to prevent; it is practically certain to draw us into the 
war without either the rights or the effectiveness of belligerents. There is one choice we 
can not make, we are incapable of making: we will not choose the path of submission and 
suffer the most sacred rights of our nation and our people to be ignored or violated. The 
wrongs against which we now array ourselves are no common wrongs; they cut to the 
very roots of human life.
With a profound sense of the solemn and even tragical character of the step I am 
taking and of the grave responsibilities which it involves, but in unhesitating obedience to 
what I deem my constitutional duty, I advise that the Congress declare the recent course 
of the Imperial German Government to be in fact nothing less than war against the 
Government and people of the United States; that it formally accept the status of 
belligerent which has thus been thrust upon it, and that it take immediate steps not only to 
put the country in a more thorough state of defense but also to exert all its power and 
employ all its resources to bring the Government of the German Empire to terms and end 
the war.
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What this will involve is clear. It will involve the utmost practicable cooperation in 
counsel and action with the governments now at war with Germany, and, as incident to 
that, the extension to those governments of the most liberal financial credits, in order that 
our resources may so far as possible be added to theirs. It will involve the organization 
and mobilization of all the material resources of the country to supply the materials of 
war and serve the incidental needs of the nation in the most abundant and yet the most 
economical and efficient way possible. It will involve the immediate full equipment of 
the Navy in all respects but particularly in supplying it with the best means of dealing 
with the enemy's submarines. It will involve the immediate addition to the armed forces 
of the United States already provided for by law in case of war at least 500,000 men, who 
should, in my opinion, be chosen upon the principle of universal liability to service, and 
also the authorization of subsequent additional increments of equal force so soon as they 
may be needed and can be handled in training. It will involve also, of course, the granting 
of adequate credits to the Government, sustained, I hope, so far as they can equitably be 
sustained by the present generation, by well conceived taxation....
While we do these things, these deeply momentous things, let us be very clear, and 
make very clear to all the world what our motives and our objects are. My own thought 
has not been driven from its habitual and normal course by the unhappy events of the last 
two months, and I do not believe that the thought of the nation has been altered or 
clouded by them I have exactly the same things in mind now that I had in mind when I 
addressed the Senate on the 22d of January last; the same that I had in mind when I 
addressed the Congress on the 3d of February and on the 26th of February. Our object 
now, as then, is to vindicate the principles of peace and justice in the life of the world as
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against selfish and autocratic power and to set up amongst the really free and self- 
governed peoples of the world such a concert of purpose and of action as will henceforth 
ensure the observance of those principles. Neutrality is no longer feasible or desirable 
where the peace of the world is involved and the freedom of its peoples, and the menace 
to that peace and freedom lies in the existence of autocratic governments backed by 
organized force which is controlled wholly by their will, not by the will of their people. 
We have seen the last of neutrality in such circumstances. We are at the beginning of an 
age in which it will be insisted that the same standards of conduct and of responsibility 
for wrong done shall be observed among nations and their governments that are observed 
among the individual citizens of civilized states.
We have no quarrel with the German people. We have no feeling towards them but 
one of sympathy and friendship. It was not upon their impulse that their Government 
acted in entering this war. It was not with their previous knowledge or approval. It was a 
war determined upon as wars used to be determined upon in the old, unhappy days when 
peoples were nowhere consulted by their rulers and wars were provoked and waged in the 
interest of dynasties or of little groups of ambitious men who were accustomed to use 
their fellow men as pawns and tools. Self-governed nations do not fill their neighbour 
states with spies or set the course of intrigue to bring about some critical posture of 
affairs which will give them an opportunity to strike and make conquest. Such designs 
can be successfully worked out only under cover and where no one has the right to ask 
questions. Cunningly contrived plans of deception or aggression, carried, it may be, from 
generation to generation, can be worked out and kept from the light only within the 
privacy of courts or behind the carefully guarded confidences of a narrow and privileged
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class. They are happily impossible where public opinion commands and insists upon full 
information concerning all the nation's affairs.
A steadfast concert for peace can never be maintained except by a partnership of 
democratic nations. No autocratic government could be trusted to keep faith within it or 
observe its covenants. It must be a league of honour, a partnership of opinion. Intrigue 
would eat its vitals away; the plottings of inner circles who could plan what they would 
and render account to no one would be a corruption seated at its very heart. Only free 
peoples can hold their purpose and their honour steady to a common end and prefer the 
interests of mankind to any narrow interest of their own.
Does not every American feel that assurance has been added to our hope for the 
future peace of the world by the wonderful and heartening things that have been 
happening within the last few weeks in Russia? Russia was known by those who knew it 
best to have been always in fact democratic at heart, in all the vital habits of her thought, 
in all the intimate relationships of her people that spoke their natural instinct, their 
habitual attitude towards life. The autocracy that crowned the summit of her political 
structure, long as it had stood and terrible as was the reality of its power, was not in fact 
Russian in origin, character, or purpose; and now it has been shaken off and the great, 
generous Russian people have been added in all their naive majesty and might to the 
forces that are fighting for freedom in the world, for justice, and for peace. Here is a fit 
partner for a league of honour.
One of the things that has served to convince us that the Prussian autocracy was not 
and could never be our friend is that from the very outset of the present war it has filled 
our unsuspecting communities and even our offices of government with spies and set
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criminal intrigues everywhere afoot against our national unity of counsel, our peace 
within and without our industries and our commerce. Indeed it is now evident that its 
spies were here even before the war began; and it is unhappily not a matter of conjecture 
but a fact proved in our courts of justice that the intrigues which have more than once 
come perilously near to disturbing the peace and dislocating the industries of the country 
have been carried on at the instigation, with the support, and even under the personal 
direction of official agents of the Imperial Government accredited to the Government of 
the United States. Even in checking these things and trying to extirpate them we have 
sought to put the most generous interpretation possible upon them because we knew that 
their source lay, not in any hostile feeling or purpose of the German people towards us 
(who were, no doubt, as ignorant of them as we ourselves were), but only in the selfish 
designs of a Government that did what it pleased and told its people nothing. But they 
have played their part in serving to convince us at last that that Government entertains no 
real friendship for us and means to act against our peace and security at its convenience. 
That it means to stir up enemies against us at our very doors the intercepted 
[ZimmeiTnannl note to the German Minister at Mexico City is eloquent evidence.
We are accepting this challenge of hostile purpose because we know that in such a 
government, following such methods, we can never have a friend; and that in the 
presence of its organized power, always lying in wait to accomplish we know not what 
purpose, there can be no assured security for the democratic governments of the world. 
We are now about to accept gage of battle with this natural foe to liberty and shall, if 
necessary, spend the whole force of the nation to check and nullify its pretensions and its 
power. We are glad, now that we see the facts with no veil of false pretence about them.
75
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
to fight thus for the ultimate peace of the world and for the liberation of its peoples, the 
German peoples included; for the rights of nations great and small and the privilege of 
men everywhere to choose their way of life and of obedience. The world must be made 
safe for democracy. Its peace must be planted upon the tested foundations of political 
liberty. We have no selfish ends to serve. We desire no conquest, no dominion. We seek 
no indemnities for ourselves, no material compensation for the sacrifices we shall freely 
make. We are but one of the champions of the rights of mankind. We shall be satisfied 
when those rights have been made as secure as the faith and the freedom of nations can 
make them.
Just because we fight without rancour and without selfish object, seeking nothing for 
ourselves but what we shall wish to share with all free peoples, we shall, I feel confident, 
conduct our operations as belligerents without passion and ourselves observe with proud 
punctilio the principles of right and of fair play we profess to be fighting for.
I have said nothing of the governments allied with the Imperial Government of 
Germany because they have not made war upon us or challenged us to defend our right 
and our honour. The Austro-Hungarian Government has, indeed, avowed its unqualified 
endorsement and acceptance of the reckless and lawless submarine warfare adopted now 
without disguise by the Imperial German Government, and it has therefore not been 
possible for this Government to receive Count Tamowski, the Ambassador recently 
accredited to this Government by the Imperial and Royal Government of Austria- 
Hungary; but that Government has not actually engaged in warfare against citizens of the 
United States on the seas, and I take the liberty, for the present at least, of postponing a
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discussion of our relations with the authorities at Vienna. We enter this war only where 
we are clearly forced into it because there are no other means of defending our rights.
It will be all the easier for us to conduct ourselves as belligerents in a high spirit of 
right and fairness because we act without animus, not in enmity towards a people or with 
the desire to bring any injury or disadvantage upon them, but only in armed opposition to 
an inesponsible government which has thrown aside all considerations of humanity and 
of right and is running amuck. We are, let me say again, the sincere friends of the 
German people, and shall desire nothing so much as the early reestablishment of intimate 
relations of mutual advantage between us — however hard it may be for them, for the 
time being, to believe that this is spoken from our hearts. We have borne with their 
present government through all these bitter months because of that friendship — 
exercising a patience and forbearance which would otherwise have been impossible. We 
shall, happily, still have an opportunity to prove that friendship in our daily attitude and 
actions towards the millions of men and women of German birth and native sympathy, 
who live amongst us and share our life, and we shall be proud to prove it towards all who 
are in fact loyal to their neighbours and to the Government in the hour of test. They are, 
most of them, as true and loyal Americans as if they had never known any other fealty or 
allegiance. They will be prompt to stand with us in rebuking and restraining the few who 
may be of a different mind and purpose. If there should be disloyalty, it will be dealt with 
with a firm hand of stem repression; but, if it lifts its head at all, it will lift it only here 
and there and without countenance except from a lawless and malignant few.
It is a distressing and oppressive duty, gentlemen of the Congress, which I have 
performed in thus addressing you. There are, it may be, many months of fiery trial and
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sacrifice ahead of us. It is a fearful thing to lead this great peaceful people into war, into 
the most terrible and disastrous of all wars, civilization itself seeming to be in the 
balance. But the right is more precious than peace, and we shall fight for the things which 
we have always carried nearest our hearts -  for democracy, for the right of those who 
submit to authority to have a voice in their own governments, for the rights and liberties 
of small nations, for a universal dominion of right by such a concert of free peoples as 
shall bring peace and safety to all nations and make the world itself at last free. To such a 
task we can dedicate our lives and our fortunes, everything that we are and everything 
that we have, with the pride of those who know that the day has come when America is 
privileged to spend her blood and her might for the principles that gave her birth and 
happiness and the peace which she has treasured. God helping her, she can do no other.
Wilson, Woodrow. “An Address to a Joint Session of Congress.” April 2, I9I7 . in 
United States Presidents (I9 I3 -I9 2 I: Wilson). President W ilson’s State Papers and 
Addresses. New York: The Review of Reviews Company, I9I7.
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APPENDIX II
President George H. W. Bush’s Address to the Nation 
Announcing Allied Military Action 
in the Persian Gulf Delivered 
January 16, I99I
Just 2 hours ago, allied air forces began an attack on military targets in Iraq and 
Kuwait. These attacks continue as I speak. Ground forces are not engaged.
This conflict started August 2d when the dictator of Iraq invaded a small and helpless 
neighbor. Kuwait — a member of the Arab League and a member of the United Nations — 
was crushed; its people, brutalized. Eive months ago, Saddam Hussein started this cruel 
war against Kuwait. Tonight, the battle has been joined.
This military action, taken in accord with United Nations resolutions and with the 
consent of the United States Congress, follows months of constant and virtually endless 
diplomatic activity on the part of the United Nations, the United States, and many, many 
other countries. Arab leaders sought what became known as an Arab solution, only to 
conclude that Saddam Hussein was unwilling to leave Kuwait. Others traveled to 
Baghdad in a variety of efforts to restore peace and justice. Our Secretary of State, James 
Baker, held an historic meeting in Geneva, only to be totally rebuffed. This past weekend, 
in a last-ditch effort, the Secretary-General of the United Nations went to the Middle East
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with peace in his heart — his second such mission. And he came back from Baghdad with 
no progress at all in getting Saddam Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait.
Now the 28 countries with forces in the Gulf area have exhausted all reasonable 
efforts to reach a peaceful resolution — have no choice but to drive Saddam from Kuwait 
by force. We will not fail.
As I report to you, air attacks are underway against military targets in Iraq. We are 
determined to knock out Saddam Hussein's nuclear bomb potential. We will also destroy 
his chemical weapons facilities. Much of Saddam's artillery and tanks will be destroyed. 
Our operations are designed to best protect the lives of all the coalition forces by 
targeting Saddam's vast military arsenal. Initial reports from General Schwarzkopf are 
that our operations are proceeding according to plan.
Our objectives are clear: Saddam Hussein's forces will leave Kuwait. The legitimate 
government of Kuwait will be restored to its rightful place, and Kuwait will once again 
be free. Iraq will eventually comply with all relevant United Nations resolutions, and 
then, when peace is restored, it is our hope that Iraq will live as a peaceful and 
cooperative member of the family of nations, thus enhancing the security and stability of 
the Gulf.
Some may ask: Why act now? Why not wait? The answer is clear: The world could 
wait no longer. Sanctions, though having some effect, showed no signs of accomplishing 
their objective. Sanctions were tried for well over 5 months, and we and our allies 
concluded that sanctions alone would not force Saddam from Kuwait.
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While the world waited, Saddam Hussein systematically raped, pillaged, and 
plundered a tiny nation, no threat to his own. He subjected the people of Kuwait to 
unspeakable atrocities — and among those maimed and murdered, innocent children.
While the world waited, Saddam sought to add to the chemical weapons arsenal he 
now possesses, an infinitely more dangerous weapon of mass destruction — a nuclear 
weapon. And while the world waited, while the world talked peace and withdrawal, 
Saddam Hussein dug in and moved massive forces into Kuwait.
While the world waited, while Saddam stalled, more damage was being done to the 
fragile economies of the Third World, emerging democracies of Eastern Europe, to the 
entire world, including to our own economy.
The United States, together with the United Nations, exhausted every means at our 
disposal to bring this crisis to a peaceful end. However, Saddam clearly felt that by 
stalling and threatening and defying the United Nations, he could weaken the forces 
arrayed against him.
While the world waited, Saddam Hussein met every overture of peace with open 
contempt. While the world prayed for peace, Saddam prepared for war.
I had hoped that when the United States Congress, in historic debate, took its resolute 
action, Saddam would realize he could not prevail and would move out of Kuwait in 
accord with the United Nation resolutions. He did not do that. Instead, he remained 
intransigent, certain that time was on his side.
Saddam was warned over and over again to comply with the will of the United 
Nations: Leave Kuwait, or be driven out. Saddam has arrogantly rejected all warnings. 
Instead, he tried to make this a dispute between Iraq and the United States of America.
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Well, he failed. Tonight, 28 nations -  countries from 5 continents, Europe and Asia, 
Africa, and the Arab League -  have forces in the Gulf area standing shoulder to shoulder 
against Saddam Hussein. These countries had hoped the use of force could be avoided. 
Regrettably, we now believe that only force will make him leave.
Prior to ordering our forces into battle, I instructed our military commanders to take 
every necessary step to prevail as quickly as possible, and with the greatest degree of 
protection possible for American and allied service men and women. I've told the 
American people before that this will not be another Vietnam, and I repeat this here 
tonight. Our troops will have the best possible support in the entire world, and they will 
not be asked to fight with one hand tied behind their back. I'm hopeful that this fighting 
will not go on for long and that casualties will be held to an absolute minimum.
This is an historic moment. We have in this past year made great progress in ending 
the long era of conflict and cold war. We have before us the opportunity to forge for 
ourselves and for future generations a new world order — a world where the rule of law, 
not the law of the jungle, governs the conduct of nations. When we are successful — and 
we will be — we have a real chance at this new world order, an order in which a credible 
United Nations can use its peacekeeping role to fulfill the promise and vision of the 
U.N.'s founders.
We have no argument with the people of Iraq. Indeed, for the innocents caught in this 
conflict, I pray for their safety. Our goal is not the conquest of Iraq. It is the liberation of 
Kuwait. It is my hope that somehow the Iraqi people can, even now, convince their 
dictator that he must lay down his arms, leave Kuwait, and let Iraq itself rejoin the family 
of peace-loving nations.
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Thomas Paine wrote many years ago; "T hese are the times that try men's souls." 
Those well-known words are so very true today. But even as planes of the multinational 
forces attack Iraq, I prefer to think of peace, not war. I am convinced not only that we 
will prevail but that out of the horror of combat will come the recognition that no nation 
can stand against a world united, no nation will be permitted to brutally assault its 
neighbor.
No President can easily commit our sons and daughters to war. They are the Nation's 
finest. Ours is an all-volunteer force, magnificently trained, highly motivated. The troops 
know why they're there. And listen to what they say, for they've said it better than any 
President or Prime Minister ever could.
Listen to Hollywood Huddleston, Marine lance corporal. He says, "L et's  free these 
people, so we can go home and be free again." And he's right. The terrible crimes and 
tortures committed by Saddam's henchmen against the innocent people of Kuwait are an 
affront to mankind and a challenge to the freedom of all.
Listen to one of our great officers out there. Marine Lieutenant General Walter 
Boomer. He said: "T here are things worth fighting for. A world in which brutality and 
lawlessness are allowed to go unchecked isn't the kind of world we're going to want to 
live in."
Listen to Master Sergeant J.P. Kendall of the 82d Airborne: "W e're  here for more 
than just the price of a gallon of gas. What we're doing is going to chart the future of the 
world for the next 100 years. It's better to deal with this guy now than 5 years from now."
And finally, we should all sit up and listen to Jackie Jones, an Army lieutenant, when 
she says, " I f  we let him get away with this, who knows what's going to be next?"
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I have called upon Hollywood and Walter and J.P. and Jackie and all their courageous 
comrades-in-arms to do what must be done. Tonight, America and the world are deeply 
grateful to them and to their families. And let me say to everyone listening or watching 
tonight: When the troops we've sent in finish their work, I am determined to bring them 
home as soon as possible.
Tonight, as our forces fight, they and their families are in our prayers. May God bless 
each and every one of them, and the coalition forces at our side in the Gulf, and may He 
continue to bless our nation, the United States of America.
Note: President Bush spoke at 9:01 p.m. from the Oval Office at the White House. In 
his address, he referred to President Saddam Hussein of Iraq; Secretary of State James A. 
Baker III; United Nations Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar de la Guerra; and 
Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf, commander of the U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf. The 
address was broadcast live on nationwide radio and television.
Bush, George H. W. “Radio Address to the Nation on the Persian Gulf Crisis, 5 Jan 
1991.” <http://bushlibrarv.tam u.edu/papers/I99I/9I0I0500.htm l.> 7 April 2004.
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APPENDIX III
President George W. Bush’s Address to a Joint Session 
of Congress and the American People 
Delivered September 20, 2001 
Mr. Speaker, Mr. President Pro Tempore, members of Congress, and fellow Americans:
In the normal course of events. Presidents come to this chamber to report on the state 
of the Union. Tonight, no such report is needed. It has already been delivered by the 
American people.
We have seen it in the courage of passengers, who rushed terrorists to save others on 
the ground — passengers like an exceptional man named Todd Beamer. And would you 
please help me to welcome his wife, Lisa Beamer, here tonight.
We have seen the state of our Union in the endurance of rescuers, working past 
exhaustion. We have seen the unfurling of flags, the lighting of candles, the giving of 
blood, the saying of prayers -  in English, Hebrew, and Arabic. We have seen the 
decency of a loving and giving people who have made the grief of strangers their own.
My fellow citizens, for the last nine days, the entire world has seen for itself the state 
of our Union — and it is strong.
Tonight we are a country awakened to danger and called to defend freedom. Our 
grief has turned to anger, and anger to resolution. Whether we bring our enemies to 
justice, or bring justice to our enemies, justice will be done.
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I thank the Congress for its leadership at such an important time. All of America was 
touched on the evening of the tragedy to see Republicans and Democrats joined together 
on the steps of this Capitol, singing "God Bless America." And you did more than sing; 
you acted, by delivering $40 billion to rebuild our communities and meet the needs of our 
military.
Speaker Hastert, Minority Leader Gephardt, Majority Leader Daschle and Senator 
Lott, I thank you for your friendship, for your leadership and for your service to our 
country.
And on behalf of the American people, I thank the world for its outpouring of 
support. America will never forget the sounds of our National Anthem playing at 
Buckingham Palace, on the streets of Paris, and at Berlin's Brandenburg Gate.
We will not forget South Korean children gathering to pray outside our embassy in 
Seoul, or the prayers of sympathy offered at a mosque in Cairo. We will not forget 
moments of silence and days of mourning in Australia and Africa and Latin America.
Nor will we forget the citizens of 80 other nations who died with our own: dozens of 
Pakistanis; more than 130 Israelis; more than 250 citizens of India; men and women from 
El Salvador, Iran, Mexico and Japan; and hundreds of British citizens. America has no 
truer friend than Great Britain. Once again, we are joined together in a great cause — so 
honored the British Prime Minister has crossed an ocean to show his unity of purpose 
with America. Thank you for coming, friend. On September the I Ith, enemies of 
freedom committed an act of war against our country. Americans have known wars — 
but for the past 136 years, they have been wars on foreign soil, except for one Sunday in 
1941. Americans have known the casualties of war — but not at the center of a great city
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on a peaceful morning. Americans have known surprise attacks — but never before on 
thousands of civilians. All of this was brought upon us in a single day — and night fell on 
a different world, a world where freedom itself is under attack.
Americans have many questions tonight. Americans are asking: Who attacked our 
country? The evidence we have gathered all points to a collection of loosely affiliated 
terrorist organizations known as al Qaeda. They are the same murderers indicted for 
bombing American embassies in Tanzania and Kenya, and responsible for bombing the 
USS Cole.
Al Qaeda is to terror what the mafia is to crime. But its goal is not making money; its 
goal is remaking the world — and imposing its radical beliefs on people everywhere.
The terrorists practice a fringe form of Islamic extremism that has been rejected by 
Muslim scholars and the vast majority of Muslim clerics — a fringe movement that 
perverts the peaceful teachings of Islam. The terrorists' directive commands them to kill 
Christians and Jews, to kill all Americans, and make no distinction among military and 
civilians, including women and children.
This group and its leader — a person named Osama bin Laden — are linked to many 
other organizations in different countries, including the Egyptian Islamic Jihad and the 
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. There are thousands of these terrorists in more than 60 
countries. They are recruited from their own nations and neighborhoods and brought to 
camps in places like Afghanistan, where they are trained in the tactics of terror. They are 
sent back to their homes or sent to hide in countries around the world to plot evil and 
destruction.
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The leadership of al Qaeda has great influence in Afghanistan and supports the 
Taliban regime in controlling most of that country. In Afghanistan, we see al Qaeda's 
vision for the world.
Afghanistan's people have been brutalized — many are starving and many have 
fled. Women are not allowed to attend school. You can be jailed for owning a 
television. Religion can be practiced only as their leaders dictate. A man can be jailed in 
Afghanistan if his beard is not long enough.
The United States respects the people of Afghanistan — after all, we are currently its 
largest source of humanitarian aid — but we condemn the Taliban regime. It is not only 
repressing its own people, it is threatening people everywhere by sponsoring and 
sheltering and supplying terrorists. By aiding and abetting murder, the Taliban regime is 
committing murder.
And tonight, the United States of America makes the following demands on the 
Taliban; Deliver to United States authorities all the leaders of al Qaeda who hide in your 
land. Release all foreign nationals, including American citizens, you have unjustly 
imprisoned. Protect foreign journalists, diplomats and aid workers in your 
country. Close immediately and permanently every terrorist training camp in 
Afghanistan, and hand over every terrorist, and every person in their support structure, to 
appropriate authorities. Give the United States full access to terrorist training camps, so 
we can make sure they are no longer operating.
These demands are not open to negotiation or discussion. The Taliban must act, and 
act immediately. They will hand over the terrorists, or they will share in their fate.
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I also want to speak tonight directly to Muslims throughout the world. We respect 
your faith. It's practiced freely by many millions of Americans, and by millions more in 
countries that America counts as friends. Its teachings are good and peaceful, and those 
who commit evil in the name of Allah blaspheme the name of Allah. The terrorists are 
traitors to their own faith, trying, in effect, to hijack Islam itself. The enemy of America 
is not our many Muslim friends; it is not our many Arab friends. Our enemy is a radical 
network of terrorists, and every government that supports them.
Our war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until 
every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated.
Americans are asking, why do they hate us? They hate what we see right here in this 
chamber -  a democratically elected government. Their leaders are self-appointed. They 
hate our freedoms — our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote 
and assemble and disagree with each other.
They want to overthrow existing governments in many Muslim countries, such as 
Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan. They want to drive Israel out of the Middle East. They 
want to drive Christians and Jews out of vast regions of Asia and Africa.
These terrorists kill not merely to end lives, but to disrupt and end a way of life. With 
every atrocity, they hope that America grows fearful, retreating from the world and 
forsaking our friends. They stand against us, because we stand in their way.
We are not deceived by their pretenses to piety. We have seen their kind 
before. They are the heirs of all the murderous ideologies of the 20th century. By 
sacrificing human life to serve their radical visions — by abandoning every value except 
the will to power -  they follow in the path of fascism, and Nazism, and
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totalitarianism. And they will follow that path all the way, to where it ends: in history's 
unmarked grave of discarded lies.
Americans are asking: How will we fight and win this war? We will direct every 
resource at our command -  every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every 
instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence, and every necessary weapon of 
war — to the disruption and to the defeat of the global terror network.
This war will not be like the war against Iraq a decade ago, with a decisive liberation 
of territory and a swift conclusion. It will not look like the air war above Kosovo two 
years ago, where no ground troops were used and not a single American was lost in 
combat.
Our response involves far more than instant retaliation and isolated 
strikes. Americans should not expect one battle, but a lengthy campaign, unlike any 
other we have ever seen. It may include dramatic strikes, visible on TV, and covert 
operations, secret even in success. We will starve terrorists of funding, turn them one 
against another, drive them from place to place, until there is no refuge or no rest. And 
we will pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism. Every nation, in every 
region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the 
terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism 
will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime.
Our nation has been put on notice: We are not immune from attack. We will take 
defensive measures against terrorism to protect Americans. Today, dozens of federal 
departments and agencies, as well as state and local governments, have responsibilities 
affecting homeland security. These efforts must be coordinated at the highest level. So
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tonight I announce the creation of a Cabinet-level position reporting directly to me — the 
Office of Homeland Security.
And tonight I also announce a distinguished American to lead this effort, to 
strengthen American security: a military veteran, an effective governor, a true patriot, a 
trusted friend — Pennsylvania's Tom Ridge. He will lead, oversee and coordinate a 
comprehensive national strategy to safeguard our country against terrorism, and respond 
to any attacks that may come.
These measures are essential. But the only way to defeat terrorism as a threat to our 
way of life is to stop it, eliminate it, and destroy it where it grows.
Many will be involved in this effort, from FBI agents to intelligence operatives to the 
reservists we have called to active duty. All deserve our thanks, and all have our 
prayers. And tonight, a few miles from the damaged Pentagon, I have a message for our 
military: Be ready. I've called the Armed Forces to alert, and there is a reason. The hour 
is coming when America will act, and you will make us proud.
This is not, however, just America's fight. And what is at stake is not just America's 
freedom. This is the world's fight. This is civilization's fight. This is the fight of all who 
believe in progress and pluralism, tolerance and freedom.
We ask every nation to join us. We will ask, and we will need, the help of police 
forces, intelligence services, and banking systems around the world. The United States is 
grateful that many nations and many international organizations have already responded - 
- with sympathy and with support. Nations from Latin America, to Asia, to Africa, to 
Europe, to the Islamic world. Perhaps the NATO Charter reflects best the attitude of the 
world: An attack on one is an attack on all.
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The civilized world is rallying to America's side. They understand that if this terror 
goes unpunished, their own cities, their own citizens may be next. Terror, unanswered, 
can not only bring down buildings, it can threaten the stability of legitimate 
governments. And you know what — we're not going to allow it.
Americans are asking: What is expected of us? I ask you to live your lives, and hug 
your children. I know many citizens have fears tonight, and I ask you to be calm and 
resolute, even in the face of a continuing threat.
I ask you to uphold the values of America, and remember why so many have come 
here. We are in a fight for our principles, and our first responsibility is to live by 
them. No one should be singled out for unfair treatment or unkind words because of their 
ethnic background or religious faith.
I ask you to continue to support the victims of this tragedy with your 
contributions. Those who want to give can go to a central source of information, 
libertyunites.org, to find the names of groups providing direct help in New York, 
Pennsylvania, and Virginia.
The thousands of FBI agents who are now at work in this investigation may need 
your cooperation, and I ask you to give it.
I ask for your patience, with the delays and inconveniences that may accompany 
tighter security; and for your patience in what will be a long struggle.
I ask your continued participation and confidence in the American 
economy. Terrorists attacked a symbol of American prosperity. They did not touch its 
source. America is successful because of the hard work, and creativity, and enterprise of
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our people. These were the true strengths of our economy before September 11th, and 
they are our strengths today. (Applause.)
And, finally, please continue praying for the victims of terror and their families, for 
those in uniform, and for our great country. Prayer has comforted us in sorrow, and will 
help strengthen us for the journey ahead.
Tonight I thank my fellow Americans for what you have already done and for what 
you will do. And ladies and gentlemen of the Congress, I thank you, their 
representatives, for what you have already done and for what we will do together.
Tonight, we face new and sudden national challenges. We will come together to 
improve air safety, to dramatically expand the number of air marshals on domestic 
flights, and take new measures to prevent hijacking. We will come together to promote 
stability and keep our airlines flying, with direct assistance during this emergency.
We will come together to give law enforcement the additional tools it needs to track 
down terror here at home. We will come together to strengthen our intelligence 
capabilities to know the plans of terrorists before they act, and find them before they 
strike.
We will come together to take active steps that strengthen America's economy, and 
put our people back to work.
Tonight we welcome two leaders who embody the extraordinary spirit of all New 
Yorkers: Governor George Pataki, and Mayor Rudolph Giuliani. As a symbol of 
America's resolve, my administration will work with Congress, and these two leaders, to 
show the world that we will rebuild New York City.
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After all that has just passed -  all the lives taken, and all the possibilities and hopes 
that died with them -  it is natural to wonder if America's future is one of fear. Some 
speak of an age of terror. I know there are struggles ahead, and dangers to face. But this 
country will define our times, not be defined by them. As long as the United States of 
America is determined and strong, this will not be an age of terror; this will be an age of 
liberty, here and across the world.
Great harm has been done to us. We have suffered great loss. And in our grief and 
anger we have found our mission and our moment. Freedom and fear are at war. The 
advance of human freedom — the great achievement of our time, and the great hope of 
every time — now depends on us. Our nation — this generation — will lift a dark threat of 
violence from our people and our future. We will rally the world to this cause by our 
efforts, by our courage. We will not tire, we will not falter, and we will not fail.
It is my hope that in the months and years ahead, life will return almost to 
normal. We'll go back to our lives and routines, and that is good. Even grief recedes 
with time and grace. But our resolve must not pass. Each of us will remember what 
happened that day, and to whom it happened. We'll remember the moment the news 
came — where we were and what we were doing. Some will remember an image of a 
fire, or a story of rescue. Some will carry memories of a face and a voice gone forever.
And I will carry this: It is the police shield of a man named George Howard, who 
died at the W orld Trade Center trying to save others. It was given to me by his mom, 
Arlene, as a proud memorial to her son. This is my reminder of lives that ended, and a 
task that does not end.
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I will not forget this wound to our country or those who inflicted it. I will not yield; I 
will not rest; I will not relent in waging this struggle for freedom and security for the 
American people.
The course of this conflict is not known, yet its outcome is certain. Freedom and fear, 
justice and cruelty, have always been at war, and we know that God is not neutral 
between them.
Fellow citizens, we'll meet violence with patient justice — assured of the rightness of 
our cause, and confident of the victories to come. In all that lies before us, may God 
grant us wisdom, and may He watch over the United States of America.
Thank you.
Bush, George W. Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People. 
January 20, 2001. <http://www.whitehouse.gOv/news/releases/2001/09/print/20010920- 
8.html>. 26 July 2004.
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